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BOOK REVIEWS
COURTING ABOLITION
COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT. By Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker. Cambridge,
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2016. Pp. 390. $29.95.
Reviewed by Deborah W Denno*
INTRODUCTION
The American death penalty is a shadow of what it once was. In
2016, states conducted fewer executions than they had in twenty-five
years,1 and juries delivered the lowest number of new death sentences
since 1972,2 the year the Supreme Court invalidated then-existing
death penalty statutes.3  Only five of the thirty-one death penalty
states even carried out an execution - the smallest number since
19834 - and two of those five states (Georgia and Texas) performed
eighty percent of all executions,5 thus indicating that actively executing
states are now outliers. In addition, approximately forty percent of
Americans now oppose the death penalty, the highest rate in over four
decades. 6 These trends are just a handful of many stunning develop-
ments occurring throughout the United States, demonstrating that the
death penalty, one of this country's most entrenched institutions, now
appears close to demise.
This decline, however, is not the first, nor even the most pro-
nounced, episode of the death penalty's diminution. Over four de-
* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law; Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center,
Fordham University School of Law. I am most thankful to the editors of the Harvard Law Re-
view for their editorial excellence and to Alissa Black-Dorward, Marianna Gebhardt, Megan
Martucci, Erica Valencia-Graham, and Benjamin Chisholm for their helpful contributions. The
Gerald Edelman Fellowship provided generous support.
1 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2016: YEAR END REPORT I, 2
(2016), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/20I6YrEnd.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVQ5-J67K]
(noting that there were just twenty executions in 2016).
2 Id. at 3.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
4 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note I, at 5; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS
ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY I (2ol1), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet
.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4RA-269M] (listing the thirty-one death penalty states and the nineteen
non-death penalty states).
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note I, at 2.
6 Id. at 7; see also Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Sentences, Executions
Drop to Historic Lows in 2016, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd20i6#pressrelease
[https://perma.cc/JU54-SYGG] ("National public opinion polls also showed support for capital
punishment at a 40-year low.").
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cades ago, capital punishment was nearly eliminated. In 1972, in
Furman v. Georgia,7 the Supreme Court held that the imposition of the
death penalty in the cases before it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.8 While the Justices deciding Furman were famously
splintered in their reasoning,9 most of them were troubled by the
degree of discretion then allotted to sentencing juries along with the
resulting arbitrariness in death-sentencing decisions. 10  As Justice
Stewart declared: "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual....
[T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."" All
told, Furman's impact was dramatic, with virtually every death-
sentencing system in the country struck down overnight1 2 at a time
when public support for the death penalty was also near its lowest
level. 13
The Furman Court's abrogation was short-lived, however: states
soon rallied to restore executions. In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,14 the
Court ruled that the death penalty was not a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment, upholding newly passed, guided-discretion ap-
proaches like Georgia's against a renewed constitutional challenge.15
Gregg therefore revitalized this country's death penalty, ending a mora-
torium that had lasted nearly ten years (from 1967 to 1976).16
With this resurgence, however, came what many have called
America's "experiment" with the death penalty - the Court's unpre-
dictable attempt not only to reinstate, but also to reform a punishment
that most thought had ended with Furman (p. 3).17 As Professors
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker contend in their book, Courting
Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, such an effort has
involved the Supreme Court's "top-down" regulation of states' applica-
408 U.S. 238.
8 Id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
9 Furman was a per curiam decision consisting of just one paragraph and nine separate opin-
ions. Id. at 239-470; see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 264 (2002) (discussing the nine opinions "divided along philosophical lines").
10 BANNER, supra note 9, at 26o-66.
11 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-1o (Stewart, J., concurring).
12 See id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/16o6/death-penalty.aspx [https://perma
.cc/T6TA-WXVX] (showing that the year 1966 marked the only time between 1937 and 2016
that - responding to the question "Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of
murder?" - more American respondents opposed the death penalty (47%) than favored it (42%)).
14 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
15 Id. at 187, 206-o7 (plurality opinion).
16 See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 106-25 (1973).
17 Justice Blackmun referred to this process as an "experiment." Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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tion of the death penalty by enforcing federal constitutional law, there-
by attempting to establish a middle ground between completely abol-
ishing capital punishment and allowing it to run amok (p. 3). In es-
sence, this revised American death penalty would continuously
undergo regulation by the federal courts, especially the Supreme
Court, in an effort to "tame" the penalty's "arbitrary, discriminatory,
and excessive applications" by way of constitutional controls (p. 40).
At least initially, this regulation seemingly fueled the death penal-
ty's acceptability by instilling "faith among justice system participants
and the general public in the reliability and fairness of the process"
(p. 4). Yet, as the Steikers stress, such faith has not stood the test of
time. The experiment has failed, and ironically so. The Court's regu-
latory mechanisms are so cumbersome and complex, their goals so du-
bious and varied, that they have unwittingly propelled the death pen-
alty's "destabilization" and weakened status, its strength never to
return again (pp. 4-5). Due to this byzantine regulation, the purported
rationales for having a death penalty - retribution and deterrence -
have been comparably diminished.
The end result is that "the Court has regulated the death penalty to
death" (p. 4). In the next ten to twenty years, the authors predict, the
Court will abolish the death penalty entirely, assuming the ideological
balance of the Court remains at least as liberal as it was before Justice
Scalia's passing (pp. 287-89). (As is discussed in section II.C, however,
this assumption is more tenuous than when the Steikers were writing.)
While the Steikers foresee a Furman II coming (pp. 258, 287), they
doubt there will be a Gregg II to bring the death penalty back again
(p. 287). The Court will have experienced too many decades of failed
efforts at intervention to give credence once again to a backlash
(pp. 287-88).
Courting Death is a markedly compelling book, an achievement
for its authors in light of the book's extraordinary breadth, not simply
about the death penalty, but also about the vast array of cultural, po-
litical, and historical forces that have helped steer its course. For the
Steikers, a brother-and-sister team, the death penalty has been a
shared passion that began with their respective stints as law clerks for
the renowned abolitionist Justice Marshall and has grown, first in their
years of practice and now further during their time as academics.
Their book captures as much of the complicated story of the death
penalty as any book can, exploring in rich relief factors that can both
shape and stymie capital punishment's future. In their academic and
real-world experiences, the Steikers are primed to take on such an am-
bitious project, and they succeed.
In this Review, I first discuss the Steikers' primary arguments and
their comprehensive depiction of the death penalty as a failed experi-
ment of judicial regulation that has "come full circle over the past fifty
years," bringing the country back to where it was in the lead-up to
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Furman in 1972 (p. 3). I then consider the legitimate, if limited, suc-
cess of reform efforts - driven both by the Court and by outside
groups - and end by analyzing sources of reform independent of con-
stitutional regulation, most particularly lethal injection litigation.
I. THE STEIKERS' ACCOUNT
In Courting Death, the Steikers examine the Court's "extensive -
and ultimately failed - effort to reform and rationalize" the United
States death penalty process "through top-down[] constitutional regula-
tion" (p. 3) over more than six decades to capture both the pre-Furman
and post-Furman eras. Their book builds in part on their prior work
from which I will occasionally draw in order to clarify or expand upon
their current proposals. I focus especially on two pieces: the Steikers'
1995 article, Sober Second Thoughts,"' which presents a relatively
more streamlined discussion of the Court's constitutional regulation of
the death penalty before this current era of greater complexity, as well
as their invited report to the American Law Institute (ALI) 19 concern-
ing how the ALI should handle Model Penal Code (MPC) section
2 IO.6,2o a provision that the ALI adopted in 1962 to delineate the pro-
cedure to be followed for imposing a death sentence. As the Steikers
and others note, section 2 Io.6 was adopted in whole or in part by a
number of states immediately following Furman, and thereby substan-
tially influenced how the Court regulated the death penalty.2 1 This
Part outlines the Steikers' arguments about regulation and their pro-
posed solutions.
A. How We Got Here
i. The Genesis of Regulation. - Courting Death first examines
how the death penalty operated in the United States before the advent
of modern constitutional regulation. This context provides fuel for the
Steikers' views on modern regulation and highlights influences that
their account does not fully address.
As the Steikers note, from the early colonial period through the late
twentieth century, the American death penalty was not a target of con-
certed national regulation, but rather a punishment enforced under the
auspices of the local criminal justice system directed at state and local
18 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 1og HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
19 AM. LAW INST., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE ON THE MATTER OF THE DEATH PENALTY annex B (2009) [hereinafter ALI
200g REPORT] (Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Report to the ALI Concerning Capital Pun-
ishment (NoV. 2008)).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 Io.6 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
21 See infra section II.A.r, pp. 1852-56.
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issues (pp. 6-8). Those officials who oversaw death penalty procedures
hailed exclusively from the political branches of government (for ex-
ample, legislators and prosecutors), a sharp contrast to the national ju-
dicial regulation that would begin in the early Ig60s (p. 8). As the
Steikers explain, "the Supreme Court fundamentally altered who con-
trolled the American death penalty" because "[p]ower moved both
from states and localities to the federal government, and from the po-
litical branches to the courts" (p. 8). These shifts thereby demonstrat-
ed "a profound break with the long sweep of American history" (p. 9).
Importantly, the Steikers note that even before the Court's inter-
vention, some death penalty practices were commonly transforming
across jurisdictions (p. 9). For example, states and localities altered
how they conducted executions, first by moving them from public to
private places and then by implementing methods of execution that
appeared to be more humane (pp. 9-16). Indeed, the Steikers state
that, before the Court began regulating the death penalty, the most
frequent constitutional challenges regarding death penalty practices
were directed toward execution methods, particularly electrocution
and the firing squad (pp. 26-31). Yet the Court avoided these early
"invitations" to constitutional regulation (p. 26). Even to this day, exe-
cution methods have remained primarily regulated by states. 2 2
One of the key forces prompting national judicial regulation, how-
ever, was the disparity between northern and southern states (p. 17).
The Steikers detail in particular the deep connection between southern
racial oppression and capital punishment (p. 17), noting, for example,
that Southerners justified retaining the death penalty as a way of pre-
venting or curtailing lynch mob violence (p. 23).23 As the Steikers
stress, "[o]ne of the strongest predictors of a state's propensity to con-
duct executions today is its history of lynch mob activity more than a
century ago" (p. 17). Not surprisingly, then, no state that was repre-
sented in the former Confederacy is included among the twenty-nine
states that have either abolished the death penalty or carried out three
or fewer executions since 1976 (p. 17).
The death penalty also exerted other forms of control and oppres-
sion when it was applied to blacks. First, it served as a threat in order
to keep blacks in a slave status (and therefore economically valuable)
because taking steps toward freedom could make blacks vulnerable to
community resentment and vigilante justice (pp. 19-20). White
22 See infra section II.B.2.C, pp. 1867-71.
23 The South did not exhibit many of the humanitarian concerns seen in other parts of the
country concerning execution methods, choosing instead to exact public vengeance by way of
lynching (pp. 25-26). "Lynchcraft," the term used for the "lynching ritual," frequently incorpo-
rated more extreme forms of violent punishment such as eye gouging or mutilation, to inflict more
severe pain (p. 25).
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Southerners' portrayal of black men as violent and sexually aggressive,
especially against white women (pp. 22-25), was particularly pro-
nounced. "Never was the (white) crowd's desire to see lethal justice
done stronger than in cases involving black rapists," the Steikers write
(p. 24).
Yet the South's oppressive use of capital punishment against black
men in particular was the very condition that initially prompted the
Supreme Court to engage in constitutional regulation, first as a brief
venture in the 19205 and 19305 and then as a way of promoting racial
justice in the Ig60s and 1970s (p. 26). "But for the dramatic regional
divide on the death penalty, the Supreme Court might never have
stepped in at all" (p. 26).
2. The Supreme Court's Involvement. - The Court did begin to
fully step in during the Ig6s, at a time of surging changes in the
United States reflected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as well as massive cultural transformations in race
relations, sex equality, the war on poverty, and attitudes toward the
Vietnam War (p. 38). It was an opportune moment in our country's
history to start evaluating death penalty practices even though few
could have predicted how quickly or thoroughly regulation would take
root (pp. 38-39).
The impetus for change started in 1963 with Rudolph v. Alabama,24
a case involving a black man sentenced to death for the alleged rape of
a white woman (p. 40). While the Court declined review, Justice
Goldberg wrote what would become a landmark dissent from denial of
certiorari along with two other Justices, in which he questioned
whether the Court should allow the death penalty for the crime of rape
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (p. 40).25 The NAACP
Legal Defense Fund (LDF) - this country's most prominent legal civil
rights organization - took note of Justice Goldberg's dissent and act-
ed on it (pp. 41-43).
With fervor and urgency propelling it, the LDF started litigating
these issues in the Supreme Court, garnering its first major win in
1968 when the Court rejected Illinois's standard for determining the
qualifications for death penalty juries (pp. 45-46).26 But this would be
just the start of the LDF's moratorium strategy over the next several
24 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
25 Id. at 889-91 (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Steikers describe the
fascinating backdrop to Rudolph and Justice Goldberg's agenda (pp. 40-41). For example, Chief
Justice Warren "urg[ed]" Justice Goldberg to remove "any reference to race," thus indicating what
would become the Court's longstanding reluctance to mention racial issues even in black defen-
dant/white victim rape cases (p. 81).
26 The authors cite Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514, 522 (1968).
1832 [Vol. 130:I827
COURTING ABOLITION
years, an approach that, despite some losses along the way, ultimately
led to Furman v. Georgia (pp. 42-48).
Furman in particular would highlight the arbitrary and capricious
implementation of the American death penalty, forming in the center
of a perfect storm of other legal and cultural developments (pp. 51-52).
These would include the waning of the death penalty in other Western
democracies, the application of constitutional criminal procedure pro-
tections to defendants charged with state crimes, and the growing
awareness of racial inequities, as well as the increasing talent, sophisti-
cation, and knowledge base of the LDF (pp. 51-52). In addition, pub-
lic support for the death penalty was at its lowest point ever, a sign of
the impact of the social and cultural reforms during that time and rela-
tively low crime rates (pp. 51-52). In particular, the nonviolent pro-
tests of the civil rights movement had highlighted the prevalence and
serious extent of racial prejudice in the South (p. 52). Without this ex-
posure, the Steikers contend, the Court likely would not have inter-
fered with state criminal justice systems at all, much less with the
death penalty (p. 52).
As the Steikers note, however, "[t]he confluence of events that made
Furman possible did not make it inevitable" (p. 6a). For example, not
only had the Court bypassed a number of the LDF's claims prior to
Furman that were critical for success in future cases (such as a chal-
lenge to racial bias in rape cases), but the Furman Court itself was
heavily divided with no definitive holding (p. 6a). Moreover, crime
rates were surging by the ig60s and 1970s, particularly in minority
communities, enabling Republican politicians to appeal to racial prej-
udice to fuel the public's unease (pp. oo-o).
A backlash against Furman quickly ensued. It was in politicians'
self-interest to preserve the death penalty, and yet, as the Furman
opinions implied, limiting the discretion of previous sentencing schemes
was critical to the death penalty's survival. So by 1976, thirty-five
states had passed new statutes directed toward limiting pre-Furman
discretion (p. 61). While in 1972 capital punishment seemed to be on
its last legs, by 1976 it appeared reinvigorated (p. 65) alongside a
"Court on the defensive" (p. 67).
The Steikers duly trace the adverse reaction to Furman and the ex-
planations for the country's turnabout, including the most pronounced
one - the uniquely interactive nature of American culture and poli-
tics. Some of the factors caught up in this interaction included the
high and rising rate of violent crime, a stress on individualism, and the
local administration of the criminal justice system (pp. 72-73). These
factors also highlight the United States' divergence from European
states "where centralized political elites imposed abolition despite pop-
ular support for the punishment" (p. 73). The nature and organization
of American society made federal abolition much more difficult.
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Yet the Steikers rightly contend that such a focus on American
exceptionalism omits three significant but easily forgotten character-
istics of the death penalty. First, until 1970 America's death sentenc-
ing system and practices were comparable to those of other Western
European countries and were moving in a similar direction (pp. 73-
74). Second, the United States has not simply retained the death pen-
alty; it has also sought to regulate the punishment aggressively (p. 74).
In other words, "retention plus constitutional regulation . . . is excep-
tional in its own right" (p. 74). Third, America's death penalty was
nearly abolished before it was eliminated in many European countries
(p. 74). Indeed, had the anticipated abolition come about, the United
States might even have been identified as the "leader" of a "human
rights revolution" (p. 76).
3. Regulation's Effects on Modern Capital Practice. - Regulation
brought with it vast changes in the process of capital representation
both at the trial level and at the appellate level (p. 195). Before 1976,
lawyers had little-to-no training in the death penalty, much less in the
development of mitigating evidence on behalf of their clients; yet by
the late 198as to early Iggos, "mitigation specialists" had come onto the
scene (p. 196). By 2000, a major goal for capital trial practice was the
development of a defense team that would consist of lawyers, investi-
gators, and mitigation specialists, who, in light of the new statutory
schemes approved by Gregg v. Georgia, focused particularly on the
punishment phase of a bifurcated trial (p. 196).
These changes ushered in a range of organizations and resource
centers created to help with capital trials, eventually producing elite
groups of lawyers, law students, and leaders all focused on eliminating
or curtailing the death penalty (pp. 196-97). Of note are two particu-
larly groundbreaking organizations and their leaders - the Equal Jus-
tice Initiative (headed by Bryan Stevenson) and the Southern Center
for Human Rights (headed by Stephen Bright) (p. 197). Further sup-
port came from a number of law schools as well as experts represent-
ing a span of specialties, including forensics and psychiatry (p. 198).
The level of legal sophistication expanded substantially, all as a conse-
quence of regulation and as a way of introducing vast improvements
in representation for death row clients.
These changes, along with many others, created a situation in
which death penalty litigation became enormously expensive and time
consuming. As the Steikers explain, two of the most "destabilizing"
outcomes of the Court's regulation have been growing costs and delay
(p. 204). Not only have the costs of capital prosecutions become far
more exorbitant than their noncapital counterparts, but the cost of the
death penalty as a whole, including that of an execution chamber, has
also multiplied. In California, for example, the death penalty has cost
the state an additional $4 billion since 1976 - a total based on the ex-
pense of a capital trial and appeals, as well as on the expense of life
11834 [Vol. 130:I827
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imprisonment on death row, as few inmates are actually executed
(p. 205).27
Financial output and delays have only been exacerbated "by per-
haps the most widely appreciated problem for the American death
penalty" - wrongful convictions (p. 207). Before the late Iggos, the
American public's response to wrongful capital convictions was rela-
tively muted (p. 208). That reaction changed markedly when news re-
ports revealed the extent of innocent offenders sentenced to death, a
problem that was dramatically spotlighted in a highly publicized con-
ference on wrongful convictions at Northwestern University in 1998
(p. 208). Thereafter, public attention fell on the fallibility of capital
cases, in part based on the work of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law's Innocence Project headed by Professors Barry Scheck and
Peter Neufeld, both at the forefront of the use of DNA technology
postconviction to discover erroneous convictions, particularly in capi-
tal cases (pp. 208-09). Over the years, more cases demonstrated the
striking impact DNA technology would have in uncovering injustice
(pp. 208-lo). As the Steikers rightly conclude: "Only when the advent
of DNA evidence revealed that an unexpectedly large number of inno-
cent defendants had been sentenced to death did the legitimating ef-
fects of the Court's constitutional regulation of capital punishment
dissipate" (p. 230).
27 See CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 62: DEATH PENALTY. INI-
TIATIVE STATUTE. 3 (2o6), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/20I6/Prop62-II o8I6.pdf [https://perma
.cc/H52S-MJJA] (noting that California "currently spends about $55 million annually [just] on the
legal challenges that follow death sentences"); PAULA M. MITCHELL & NANCY HAYDT,
ALARCON ADVOCACY CTR., LOYOLA LAW SCH., CALIFORNIA VOTES 2016: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE COMPETING DEATH PENALTY BALLOT INITIATIVES 5, 9, 40 (2016),
http://www.l1s.edu/media/loyolalawschool/newsroom/newsitems/FINAL%20Alarcon%20Advocacy
%2oCenter%2oReport%2oCompeting%2ODP%2olnitiatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/R63L-MUE5]
(explaining that California has invested approximately $5 billion over the last 40 years ($125 mil-
lion per year) on a death penalty that has executed only 13 individuals and that capital trials re-
quired about $i million more to prosecute than noncapital first-degree murder trials handing
down a sentence of life without the possibility of parole); Jennifer Medina, Californians Face
Stark Choices on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 20I6, at Ar4 (stating that the death penal-
ty costs approximately "$150 million a year for trials, appeals and death row facilities"); see also
Arthur L. Alarc6n & Paula M. Mitchell, Costs of Capital Punishment in California: Will Voters
Choose Reform This November?, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221, 241-50 (2012) (projecting that the
death penalty will cost $5-8 billion more than life without the possibility of parole between 2013
and 2050). But see Mark Peterson, Editorial, Reform the Death Penalty, Vote Yes on Prop 66,
MERCURY NEWS (San Jose) (Aug. 1o, 2016, 7:02 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2oi6
/o8/Io/peterson-reform-the-death-penalty-vote-yes-on-prop-66 [https://perma.cc/NGG7-SSFg]
(contending that "the California Department of Corrections has never confirmed" that it costs the
state an additional $go,ooo per year to accommodate a death row prisoner).
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B. How Death Penalty Regulation Works
i. Regulating Uneven State Practice. - A major part of the
Steikers' project is the exploration of the unexpected and inadvertent
outcomes of the Court's death penalty regulation. The goal of regula-
tion is "uniformity" - consistent and stable procedures to make the
application of the punishment more "regular" (p. 117). Yet any given
regulation must be interpreted and carried out by an array of govern-
mental entities and individuals, ranging from legislatures to multiple
levels of courts to tiers of executive officials in the criminal justice sys-
tem (p. 117). There can be resistance or receptivity at any step of the
way, compounded by varying cultures and proceedings across or with-
in different states (pp. 117-18). The regulation of a system as complex
as the death penalty can thus foster "extraordinary opportunities for
divergence - the possibility that the regulation will mean quite differ-
ent things in different places" (p. 117). Indeed, the Supreme Court's
regulation "has produced state capital systems that are worlds apart"
from one another (p. 121). According to the Steikers, these divisions
create much of the instability that has weakened the death penalty
overall.
The Steikers posit that this divergence has created four types of
death penalty jurisdictions in the United States: "abolitionist states,"
which have no death penalty (such as Michigan); "de facto or virtually
abolitionist states," which have a death penalty on the books but very
few death sentences and executions (such as Colorado); "symbolic
states," which impose a substantial number of death sentences but
rarely execute anyone (such as California); and "executing states,"
which impose a sizeable number of death sentences and carry out a
relatively high proportion of them (such as Texas) (p. ][8).28
Of the thirty-one states that have a death penalty,2 9 just a few con-
duct the great majority of executions.30 Thus a substantial number of
states have a death penalty statute but rarely or never execute anyone.
These "symbolic states" may not need much regulation because they
are not the ones typically causing the constitutional disruption: the
problems of death penalty regulation are greatest in the "executing
states" because they are most apt to violate due process to reach their
goals.
28 The "symbolic state" of California (p. 118), for example, has the largest death row popula-
tion in the country (more than seven hundred inmates), yet the state has executed only thirteen
inmates since 1978 (p. r). In sharp contrast, the "executing state" of Texas, while having 244 in-
mates on death row, has put to death nearly 40% of the 1447 individuals executed in the United
States since 1976. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4, at 1-3.
29 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4, at i (listing the thirty-one death penalty
states).
3o See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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According to the Steikers, execution rates are most strongly affected
by how quickly death penalty cases proceed through state and federal
mechanisms of review (p. 129). For example, Texas has procedures
that expedite the review process (p. 130). In contrast, California has
far more checks and safeguards (pp. 131-32), at least for now.3 1 Simi-
larly, the quality of representation is lower in Texas than in California,
where lawyers meet higher standards and are better compensated than
their Texan counterparts (pp. 130-32). As the Steikers explain, the dif-
ferences between California and Texas in capital defense illustrate the
broader differences between "symbolic states" - which have stronger
legal protections - and "executing states," which value speed and re-
sults at the expense of due process (pp. 147-48).
The Steikers query whether a state's status as either "executing" or
"symbolic" is especially stable (p. 153). One might expect that a sym-
bolic state that carries out no executions may eventually abolish the
punishment altogether. But the Steikers remind us that symbolic
states may persist as they reap the benefits of capital punishment
while avoiding the costs of actually carrying out any executions
(p. 153). After all, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
when basically all serious crimes were eligible for the death penalty,
there were some offenders sentenced to "simulated executions" in
which, for example, they experienced the preparatory steps to a hang-
ing (standing for a time with a rope about their neck), but were spared
actual death (p. 116). Presumably, simulated executions and last-
moment reprieves enabled authorities to broadcast the state's power
and control without having to take a life - a helpful maneuver given
that incarceration was not yet available as an alternative (p. 116).
Similarly, today, some symbolic states "might reflect a unique com-
promise that serves an ongoing, if unrecognized, social purpose of me-
diating the demands for harsh punishment and the realities of modern
legal processes and sensibilities" (p. 153), seemingly irrespective of the
substantial financial costs. California may well become an example of
such a compromise. In November 2016, the state rejected Proposition
62, which would have eliminated the death penalty, but passed
3 California recently passed Proposition 66, which has the objective of accelerating the execu-
tion timeline. Jazmine Ulloa & Julie Westfall, California Voters Approve an Effort to Speed Up
the Death Penalty with Prop. 66, L.A. TIMES (NOV. 22, 2016, 7:OO PM), http://www.latimes.com
/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-proposition-66-death-penalty-passes-I479869
920-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/58Dg-HAGD] (noting that Proposition 66, which won by a
preliminary count of 5 1.3% of the vote, "[was intended] to speed up executions by designating tri-
al courts to hear petitions challenging death row convictions, limiting successive petitions and ex-
panding the pool of lawyers who could take on death penalty appeals" - as opposed to Proposi-
tion 62, which lost with 46.1% of the vote and would have substituted life in prison without
parole for the death penalty).
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Proposition 66, which is intended to speed up executions. 3 2 California
voters were nearly evenly split between the two propositions, and
Proposition 66 was only slightly more popular. California thus exem-
plifies a state whose population is not unified on the death penalty but
may appreciate the symbolic value of severity despite the expense.3 3
In order to limit the number of cases that "executing states" can
render death eligible, the Supreme Court has created four doctrines
that frame the Court's regulatory approach (p. 158). Some of these
doctrines, however, are unevenly enforced, some can backfire, and
some provide meager guidance. Indeed it is through these four doc-
trines that the death penalty experiment has failed so profoundly, as
the Steikers drive home in a remarkably comprehensive and detailed
account of each doctrine's weaknesses and contradictions.
2. The Component Regulatory Doctrines. - The first doctrine,
narrowing (pp. 158-63), restricts the kinds of murders subject to the
death penalty through specified aggravating factors (p. 158) in an ef-
fort to identify the "'worst of the worst' offenders according to com-
munity standards" (p. 159). The second doctrine, proportionality, lim-
its the types of offenses and offenders that are death eligible (pp. 158,
163-65, 276-81). With respect to the types of offenses, the Court has
deemed the death penalty unconstitutional for the rape of an adult
woman 34 (p. 63) and the rape of a child35 (pp. 280-81). It has also
curtailed the types of felony murder that can be considered death eli-
gible 3 6 and drawn limits on offender eligibility, exempting the intellec-
tually disabled 3 7 and juveniles. 3  The third doctrine, individualized
32 Id.
33 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the high cost of the California death
penalty).
34 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding "that a sentence
of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape [of an adult
woman] and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment").
35 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (holding that "a death sentence for one
who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments").
36 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional
for an individual "who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life," id. at
787). Five years later the Court limited the reach of Enmund with respect to the mental state of
"reckless indifference to human life," which the Court equated to Enmund's concept of "culpabil-
ity." Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
37 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that imposing the death penalty on
an intellectually disabled offender is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
3 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding unconstitutional under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile offenders under the
age of 18 at the time their offenses were committed).
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sentencing (pp. 165-68), mandates that states allow jurors to use miti-
gating factors as a basis for a sentencing less than death (p. 158).39
The fourth doctrine, heightened reliability (pp. 168-75), is the
Court's vaguest category, and requires that states apply additional le-
gal safeguards in capital cases because "death is different" from other
kinds of sanctions. Such safeguards have included invalidating a
death sentence because the sentencing judge was provided information
about a defendant that was not shared with the defense attorney,40 as
well as enabling defense counsel to question potential jurors about
their proclivities for racial bias in cases of interracial murder 4 1 or tell-
ing jurors about the actual consequences of a "life" sentence when
"life" translates into life without the possibility of parole (pp. 168-69).42
The Steikers suggest that these doctrines make it appear as though
the Court is "imposing a confusing morass of hyper-technical rules"
when in fact "contemporary death penalty law is remarkably unde-
manding" (p. 175). Thus, as the following sections discuss, appear
ances belie a system that does not adequately protect capital defend-
ants and exposes them to disparate treatment.
C. The Failures of Regulation
The Steikers focus on four failures of the Court's regulatory pro-
ject. First, the Court has shirked its regulatory function. The key ex-
amples of this underregulation are inmate claims of innocence and ra-
cial bias. Second, the Court has distorted the reality of the death
penalty by failing to candidly acknowledge the racial-justice motiva-
tions behind its regulatory project. Third, the project has failed "on its
own terms" (p. 156), by neglecting to meaningfully address, and at
times by exacerbating, the Furman Court's vexations - arbitrariness
39 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 1o (1982) ("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion))); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 6o8 (plurality opinion) (holding that "a
death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion) (holding unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments North
Carolina's statute mandating the death penalty for all persons convicted of first-degree murder).
40 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
"petitioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part,
on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain," id. at 362, after the
state failed to disclose information to the defense that was provided to the sentencing judge).
41 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (Ig86) (holding "that a capital defendant accused
of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and
questioned on the issue of racial bias").
42 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (plurality opinion) (holding that
defendant's due process was denied "by the refusal of a state trial court to instruct the jury in the
penalty phase of a capital trial that under state law the defendant was ineligible for parole").
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and caprice. Finally, regulation has had the unintended consequences
of at first legitimizing and then destabilizing the practice of capital
punishment altogether.
j. The Court's Shirking. - The classic examples of the Court
shirking its regulatory function come by way of the Steikers' examina-
tion of postconviction review and most particularly the Court's reac-
tion to an inmate's claim of actual innocence (pp. 173-75). So far the
Court has not yet determined whether inmates possess a federal consti-
tutional right to be freed from incarceration if they provide proof of
their actual innocence. 4 3  As the Steikers note, even if a death-
sentenced inmate uncovers undeniable evidence of his actual inno-
cence, the Constitution does not necessarily require courts to save him
from execution. Rather, states have rules concerning when inmates
can raise such claims, necessitating that they be proffered relatively
soon after conviction; if a claim comes too late, the courts then require
the inmate to rely on executive clemency (p. 173). That said, in
Herrera v. Collins,4 4 the Court presumed that "in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant fed-
eral habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim." 4 5 Likewise, in 2009 the Court took the historic step of mandat-
ing a new evidentiary hearing for Georgia inmate Troy Davis based
upon his claims of innocence because, among other revelations, seven
of the State's nine eyewitnesses who testified against him at trial later
recanted. 4 6 While the burden of proving an actual-innocence claim is
"extraordinarily high" 4 7 and there remain "inadequate protections
against wrongful convictions" (pp. 173-74), the successful cases have
had a powerful impact on public perception of the death penalty. 48
For the Steikers and others, McCleskey v. Kemp 4 9 constitutes "[t]he
most significant missed opportunity for heightened reliability" in light
43 Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71 (2009) ("Whether such a federal right ex-
ists is an open question. We have struggled with it over the years, in some cases assuming,
arguendo, that it exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the
high standard any claimant would have to meet."); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)
(explaining the role of federal habeas courts, which is to protect individuals from being unconsti-
tutionally imprisoned and not to rectify legal errors); BRIAN R. MEANS, PoSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES § 6:17 (20I6 ed.) (noting that the Court has not "definitively resolve[d]" the federal
constitutional rights associated with actual innocence).
44 506 U.S. 390.
45 Id. at 417.
46 In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 953 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The substantial risk of put-
ting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate justification for holding an eviden-
tiary hearing.").
47 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
48 See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
49 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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of a study of post-Furman Georgia conducted by Professor David
Baldus showing how strongly race influenced capital sentencing
(p. 174). Yet the Court was concerned about the slippery-slope conse-
quences for the criminal justice system as a whole: the Eighth
Amendment is relevant to all penalties, not just capital punishment,
and the Court could foresee the expansion of racial bias claims for oth-
er types of sentences (pp. 174-75). Thus, the Court's dismissal of the
Baldus study's results illustrates the extent to which the Court would
turn a blind eye to substantial and sophisticated evidence of arbitrari-
ness and highlights the constraints of the "death is different" doctrine
(pp. 174-75). As the Steikers explain, this reaction exemplifies "the
tendency of the Court to retreat from acknowledged or apparent con-
stitutional norms when it regards remedial choices as unworkable or
unattractive" (p. 236).
Despite the Court's heightened reliability regulatory doctrine, the
Steikers argue that there are few additional safeguards and those that
exist are reflective more of the Court's responses to particular cases
than of a consistent and principled effort to protect capital defendants
(p. 169). In addition, when it comes to the paltry standard of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel 50 or the standard of review for peremptory
strikes of jurors, 5 1 for example, death is not treated any differently
than other types of punishment (pp. 168-72). Rather, the "death is dif-
ferent" doctrine has its own set of deficiencies that commonly render it
ineffectual just when it is most needed. 52
2. The Disappearance of Race. - In addition to substantive short-
falls, the Court has often failed to be candid about the motivations be-
hind its regulatory project. As the Steikers explain: "One can read the
entire canon of the Court's pathbreaking cases on capital punishment
during the Ig6os and 1970s without getting the impression that the
death penalty was an issue of major racial significance in American
society" (p. 79). The Steikers think this finding is "at once mysterious
and understandable," suggesting that racial silence may reflect the
Court's "fears and anxieties" (p. 79). Regardless, silence has implica-
tions (p. 79), and one of its most troubling outcomes is the continuation
of a death penalty that does not acknowledge all aspects of its devas-
tating racial history.
50 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a "capital sentencing
proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial" with respect to the standard for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).
51 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005) (holding unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment a prosecutor's peremptory striking of jurors based on race).
52 See Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1599, 16oo (2001).
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The death penalty canon is replete with examples of the Court
submerging race. In Coker v. Georgia,5 3 for example, the Court chose
a white defendant "as the face of the claim" (p. 95) and avoided any
discussion of the racially discriminatory application of the death penal-
ty in its holding that the death penalty for the crime of rape was dis-
proportionate under the Eighth Amendment (pp. 95-98). This conclu-
sion, however, shielded evidence that, as the LDF pointed out in its
brief, Georgia's "death penalty for rape was specifically devised as a
punishment for the rape of white women by black men" (p. 96).54
Likewise, McCleskey concerned the interpretation of a sophisticated
statistical study demonstrating that black-defendant, white-victim
combinations for murder cases were far more likely to receive a death
sentence relative to other racial combinations (p. 102). Regardless, the
Court upheld a death sentence involving that very racial combination,
stressing that group statistics did not necessarily indicate that
McCleskey himself had been a victim of racial discrimination
(pp. 102-03).
The Steikers provide an insightful analysis of why the Justices took
a race-neutral approach to the constitutionality of the death penalty
For example, they argue that while the Court considered race in cases
such as Brown v. Board of Education,5 5 the Court "hesitated to add
capital punishment to the simmering pot of racial issues" (p. 99) be-
cause those accused of murder and rape are hardly as sympathetic as
schoolchildren. Likewise, explaining a heated topic like the death
penalty using procedural justice arguments "may have seemed less so-
cially divisive than applying the lens of racial justice" (p. 103).
The Steikers are also right to contend that these kinds of explana-
tions, however understandable, come at a cost to the Court's later
decisionmaking. The Court's avoidance of discussing racial discrimi-
nation in cases such as Rudolph and Coker, for example, weakened the
acceptance of such a claim when McCleskey was decided in 1987
(p. iii). In essence, then, the implications of the Court's shunning of
racial matters - no matter the reason - are cumulative over time,
and therefore hinder efforts to create a race-conscious jurisprudence
for future cases (pp. 112-13).
3. The Failure to Cabin Arbitrariness. - The Steikers stress that
the Court's doctrines have also neglected to address the jury discretion
3 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
54 The authors quote Brief for Petitioner at 54, Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (No. 75-5444).
5 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. There-
fore . . . the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are,
by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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and concomitant arbitrariness that Furman found constitutionally pro-
hibited. Although the doctrine of narrowing attempts to rationalize
capital sentencing, some of its aggravating factors are so vague and
overbroad (for example, a defendant committing a murder in an "espe-
cially heinous, cruel, or depraved" way)5 6 that they can actually ex-
pand the pool of those death eligible (p. 159). "Ultimately, the effort to
achieve meaningful narrowing through aggravating factors has failed,"
and jurors retain just as much discretion to impose the sentence they
deem appropriate (p. 162).
Though the Steikers find proportionality to be the most successful
of the regulatory doctrines (p. 164), it too has led to arbitrariness. By
the early 2000s, the Court held the death penalty to be disproportion-
ate for intellectually disabled offenders 5  and a few years later for ju-
venile offenders58 (pp. 163-64, 277-78). Whereas the constraints on
juveniles are designated in terms of a bright-line rule (anyone under
age eighteen), there is no such bright line for assessing who is intellec-
tually disabled. Over the years, courts have been resistant to establish-
ing the precise criteria necessary for defining a category of intellectual-
ly disabled offenders, a problem that enables courts to continue to
engage in arbitrary decisionmaking (p. 64). '
Finally, the Steikers argue, the doctrine of individualized sentenc-
ing reintroduces the jury discretion and accompanying arbitrariness
that Furman attempted to root out of the capital system (p. 65). This
outcome, to the Steikers, represents "the central tension in American
death penalty law: its simultaneous command that states cabin discre-
tion of who shall die while facilitating discretion of who shall live"
(p. 65).
Within this context, the Steikers offer suggestions on how the Court
could better regulate the death penalty. First, in terms of its narrowing
doctrine, the Court could more accurately assess the reliability and
precision of aggravating factors, for example, and retain those factors
that can be more easily measured (such as the killing of a police of-
ficer) while eliminating those factors that allow for the most discretion
("especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel" acts) (p. 177). With respect
56 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 643 (iggo) (noting that one of the ten aggravating fac-
tors under Arizona's capital sentencing statute "is whether the defendant committed the offense in
an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner").
5 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
8 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
59 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) (rendering a Florida statute unconstitution-
al under the Eighth Amendment because it precluded consideration of further evidence of a capi-
tal defendant's degree of intellectual disability if that defendant's test IQ score was greater than
seventy); see also Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, slip. op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (holding that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals used outdated measures and ignored current medical standards
in determining who was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty).
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to the proportionality doctrine, the Court could also exclude from
death eligibility offenders with severe mental illness while more strong-
ly enforcing its protections of inmates with intellectual disability
(p. 178). Other recommendations for enhancing the "death is different"
emphasis sweep more broadly: heighten the standards for attorney per-
formance in capital cases, alter capital doctrine in light of the evidence
on wrongful convictions, cap the use of future dangerousness experts,
provide structural reform for attorneys, offer state or regional review
of local decisionmaking among death penalty prosecutors, and conduct
an investigation of the vast geographical disparities in executions
(pp. 178-80, 184-85). Of course, as the Steikers recognize, others have
made similar kinds of recommendations, but there have been few cor-
rectives stemming from them.
4. Unintended Consequences of Regulation. - According to the
Steikers, all of the judicial oversight and regulation over the years has
"legitimate[d]" the death penalty process by introducing "a false aura
of rationality, even science, around the necessarily moral task of decid-
ing life or death" (p. 188). "By 'legitimate,"' the Steikers "do not mean
a process in which the Court actually justified faith in the capital sys-
tem, but rather one in which the Court induced a false or exaggerated
belief in the normative justifiability of the workings of the American
death penalty" (p. 188). Not only do jurors actually have more power
in deciding cases than they think they do, but all the actors in the
criminal justice system also wrongly believe that they have more layers
of review for their decisions than actually exist (p. 190). While "sen-
tencers may be comforted by the apparent mathematical precision of
modern capital sentencing regimes, prosecutors may feel emboldened
in seeking the imposition of the death penalty" (pp. 189-9o).
The takeaway is that the LDF attorneys in Furman and Gregg, av-
id about abolishing the death penalty, inadvertently propelled a system
that only looked legitimate but actually grounded the death penalty in
its place (p. 191). Once the system was in force, death sentences and
executions rapidly increased as polls demonstrated growing public
support for the death penalty and legislative reviews of capital convic-
tions decreased. Yet by the start of the millennium, the long-term de-
stabilizing effects of constitutional regulation finally began to be re-
vealed. The first chapter in this destabilizing story concerned new
evidence of the many wrongly convicted inmates on death row
(p. 192).
D. Predictions for the Death Penalty's Demise
The marked and continuing decline in both executions and the
number of new death sentences nationwide - in addition to dwindling
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public support and the decreasing number of states still retaining the
death penalty 60 - fuels the Steikers' contention that the death penalty
is becoming increasingly fragile (pp. 2 12-I6). The Steikers rightly at-
tribute some of the decline in executions to states' problems with im-
plementing lethal injection and challenges in the acquisition of lethal
injection drugs and proper protocols (pp. 2 I2-I3).61 But there have al-
so been substantial changes over the years in legal practice and politics
that have contributed to the death penalty's newfound vulnerability
(p. 255). Because other potential avenues of abolition are either diffi-
cult or foreclosed (pp. 255-58), the Steikers contend that if and when
abolition occurs it will be the result of a Supreme Court ruling, a
"Furman II" (p. 258). Of course, such a trajectory is conditional on the
Court's composition and the assurance of at least five votes for aboli-
tion. For the Steikers, those votes do not appear that far away
(p. 258).62
i. The Steikers' Abolition "Blueprint." - The Steikers offer one
vision of a plan for abolition (p. 271), which can be based on several
possible packages of tactical options in light of the various flaws de-
tected in the death penalty's administration. While they view the pro-
portionality principle of the Eighth Amendment as the superior path to
constitutional abolition in part because it is the one that appears "most
60 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. According to the Steikers, "the number of new
death sentences nationwide is the best evidence of the prevailing commitment to the practice, be-
cause that total reflects the considered choices of prosecutors and jurors when faced with the con-
crete choice of death or life imprisonment" (p. 213).
61 The Death Penalty Information Center has emphasized the importance of lethal injection
challenges in particular. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note I, at 5 ("This continuing
decline [in executions] reflects both the increasing geographic isolation and outlier application of
capital punishment in the United States, but is unquestionably also affected by measures the
American pharmaceutical industry have undertaken to prevent states from obtaining their medi-
cines for use in executions, human rights regulations adopted by the European Union to prevent
export of materials and supplies that can be used in executions or for purposes of torture, and a
court order directing the federal Food and Drug Administration to prevent the illegal importation
of execution drugs.").
62 As the Steikers note, seven Justices - five former Justices and two current ones - have
determined that the death penalty should be rendered unconstitutional since Furman: Justices
Brennan and Marshall in Furman itself; Justice Blackmun in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Justice Stevens in Baze v. Rees,
553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); and Justice Powell, who changed
his mind about the death penalty after he left the Court having authored Furman and casting the
fifth vote in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (pp. 258-59). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
have said that it is "highly likely that the death penalty" is unconstitutional. Glossip v. Gross, 135
S. Ct. 2726, 2776-77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Steikers suggest that such ideological
movement among Justices comports with Justice Marshall's view - often called the "Marshall
hypothesis" - that "even the most hesitant of citizens" could be convinced that the death penalty
was "morally reprehensible" if provided enough of the right kind of information, most particularly
that the death penalty is discriminatory (pp. 259-7 ) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
363-64 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
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likely" to result in a Furman II decision, they first discuss the down-
sides of certain "alternative paths" (p. 272) - the "most obvious rivals
to the proportionality approach" (p. 2 75) - as a way of justifying their
selection. These paths include: (i) wrongful convictions and the likeli-
hood of executing innocent individuals (which faces the challenges of
identifying both a workable definition of "innocence" and a constitu-
tional basis 63 ) (pp. 272-73); (2) general arbitrariness, including racial
discrimination (which faces challenges related to collecting and analyz-
ing empirical evidence) (pp. 273-74); as well as (3) long delays between
sentencing and execution (which faces the challenges of marked varia-
bility among states in delay time and insufficient traction to garner a
constitutional ban) (pp. 274-75). The Steikers note that, in sharp con-
trast, the proportionality principle has two advantages: first, it is broad
enough to incorporate these three alternative paths and second, it has
a long and established history within the Court's Eighth Amendment
doctrine, starting with the Court's "evolving standards of decency" test
as determined by "legislative enactments" and "jury verdicts" (p. 275).
The Steikers review the proportionality principle's historical path
and the factors that influenced the principle's application to both of-
fenses and offenders as a way of supporting their recommendation and
its workability. The review starts with the Coker Court's decision in
1977 to eliminate the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman 64
just a year after Gregg was decided (p. 276). Coker was based in part
upon the Court's finding that "relatively few death sentences for rap-
ists" had been imposed in the previous few years (p. 276). Within five
years, the Court in Enmund would also limit the extent to which felo-
ny murder would be considered death eligible,6 5 applying an analysis
similar to Coker but with "one notable addition": the incorporation of
"prosecutorial decisions, along with those of legislatures and juries, as
objective evidence of society's views" (p. 277). As the Enmund Court
explained, if prosecutors hardly ever pursued the death penalty for ac-
complice felony murder, it would be some indication that they viewed
death as disproportionate in this circumstance (pp. 276-77).
The Court would lay the foundation for its staunchest proportion-
ality doctrine, however, in three decisions over a six-year period (from
2002 to 2008) in which it rendered the death penalty unconstitutional
63 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's indecision con-
cerning the constitutional validation of inmates' claims of innocence.
64 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
65 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982). Even though Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987), limited the breadth of Enmund, see supra note 36, the Steikers contend that this con-
straint did not affect the Court's ongoing reliance on the approach it used in Coker (p. 277).
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for intellectually disabled offenders 66 and juvenile offenders,'6 7 as well
as for the crime of child rape. 68  As the Steikers stress, "[iut is these
three decisions - two of which were authored by Justice Kennedy -
that flesh out the Court's proportionality doctrine as a potential blue-
print for a categorical constitutional ruling" (p. 277).
These cases would incorporate even more factors relevant to such a
blueprint. According to Atkins v. Virginia,'69 for example, it wasn't
just the number of states that were starting to prohibit the execution of
the intellectually disabled, but also "the consistency of the direction of
change" in which they were moving (p. 278).70 The relatively small
number of states at issue (eighteen) were all heading toward prohibi-
tion (pp. 277-78). Another factor supporting proportionality was the
more amorphous and controversial "broader [social] and professional
consensus" (p. 278).71 The groups within this consensus category
ranged from professional organizations of experts on intellectual dis-
ability to members of different religious communities to peer members
of the international community, specifically European countries that
had long disfavored the execution of the intellectually disabled (p. 278).
In Roper v. Simmons 7 2 which eliminated the death penalty for ju-
venile offenders, the Court added yet another factor. Like in Atkins,
the Roper Court highlighted that state legislatures were evolving in a
similar direction. As the Steikers stress, though, "the centerpiece of the
Court's analysis was its reference to extensive expert opinion, present-
ed in 'scientific and sociological studies"' (p. 279),73 concerning how
juveniles differed from adults in three major ways: their immaturity
and lessened self-control, their vulnerability to peer pressure, and their
less developed identities. These differences diminished juveniles' cul-
pability as well as their receptivity to deterrence (pp. 279-80). The fo-
cus on scientific research was also relevant in noncapital cases in
which the Court held that, for juveniles, the sentence of life without
the possibility of parole (LWOP) was unconstitutional (pp. 28I-82).74
The Steikers have assembled a multifactor framework rooted in the
Court's proportionality jurisprudence. Along with the Court's "own
66 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
67 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
68 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
69 536 U.S. 304.
70 Id. at 315.
71 The authors quote Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
72 543 U.S. 551
7 The authors quote Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
74 See Graham v. Florida, 56o U.S. 48, 82 (2010) ("The Constitution prohibits the imposition of
a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.").
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judgment" (p. 284),' this framework provides the "[b]lueprint for
[c]onstitutional [a]bolition" (p. 271) that the Steikers suggest will pro-
duce a Furman II (p. 272). Such a structure incorporates into the
Court's evolving proportionality doctrine (p. 275) the three competing
alternatives that the Steikers raised - the combination of wrongful
convictions (pp. 272-73), general arbitrariness (pp. 273-74), and
lengthy delays (pp. 274-75). Though based initially upon "legislative
enactments" and "jury verdicts," the proportionality jurisprudence has
expanded to consider the contributions of other factors: the number of
death sentences (p. 276), "prosecutorial decisions" (p. 277), the "direc-
tion of change" in legislative enactments, "societal and professional
consensus" (p. 278), and expert opinion (pp. 279-80). While the
framework is complex, its core is proportionality.
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent in Glossip v. Gross. - Justice Breyer's
dissent in Glossip v. Gross7 6 is one of the latest indications of the pos-
sibility of constitutional abolition. In Glossip, the Court upheld under
the Eighth Amendment Oklahoma's lethal injection procedure, which
included the application of a potentially problematic drug (midazo-
lam). The Court determined that the district court did not commit
clear error in finding that Oklahoma's execution protocol presented no
"substantial risk of severe pain" and that "the prisoners failed to iden-
tify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails
a lesser risk of pain."7 7  In a long and noteworthy dissent (joined by
Justice Ginsburg), Justice Breyer concluded that the death penalty
"now likely constitutes a legally prohibited 'cruel and unusual
punishmen[t]. '
Justice Breyer examined the death penalty's continuous failures
since 1976 based on decades of experience and the results of a range of
social science research (p. 267). He noted three "fundamental constitu-
tional defects" with the death penalty's administration as well as a
fourth factor - that most of the United States no longer employed the
death penalty.7 9  The first fundamental defect was "convincing evi-
dence that . .. innocent people have been executed" and that other in-
nocent people could have been executed had they not been entirely ex-
onerated beforehand (p. 267).so
7 The authors quote Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the ques-
tion of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.").
76 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
7 Id. at 2731.
8 Id. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
79 Id. at 2755-56.
so The authors quote Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Second, Justice Breyer focused on arbitrariness in the death penal-
ty's application, looking especially to Professor John Donohue's strik-
ing study of Connecticut's death penalty (pp. 267-68).1 According to
Donohue, not only was a defendant's conduct (at best) weakly corre-
lated with the chances of receiving a death sentence, but also other
factors that should have been irrelevant (or extralegal8 2) were corre-
lated - murder victims' race, defendants' and victims' gender, and
the murder's location (p. 268).
The third fundamental defect, according to Justice Breyer, con-
cerned the "excessively long periods of time" inmates were commonly
housed on death row - an average of about eighteen years - which
typically involved stretches of solitary confinement for most of their
stays (p. 268). In Justice Breyer's view, inmates' protracted isolation
and lack of knowledge about when or whether they would be executed
"undermine[] the death penalty's penological rationale" of deterrence
and retribution, especially since any executions that did occur were of-
ten carried out decades after defendants committed their offenses
(p. 268).84 Expediting executions would not fix the problem because
most delays resulted from courts' attempts to ensure a just and reliable
process (p. 268). As Justice Breyer explained: "[W]e can have a death
penalty that at least arguably serves legitimate penological purposes or
we can have a procedural system that at least arguably seeks reliability
and fairness in the death penalty's application. We cannot have both"
(p. 268). 5 Judge Cormac J. Carney, a federal district court judge in
California, also put the problem into perspective, stressing that "sys-
temic delay" has rendered executions "so unlikely" that a death sen-
tence deliberated upon by a jury "has been quietly transformed into
one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison,
with the remote possibility of death." 6
81 Glossip, '35 S. Ct. at 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 "Extralegal" means "not regulated or sanctioned by law." Extralegal, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extralegal [https://perma.cc/7KA6
-VJRH]. In some social science research, for example, extralegal factors are considered to be
based on "jurors' sentiments." Barbara F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence
and Extralegal Factors in Jurors' Decisions, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 423, 427 (1986). Factors
could include the "defendants' and victims' personal characteristics or life styles," id., such as the
defendant's level of attractiveness or whether the victim was considered of "poor moral charac-
ter," id. at 428 tbl.i. In contrast, legal factors would include acceptable trial evidence, such as
whether the victim was injured or a gun was recovered. Id.
83 The authors quote Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84 The authors quote Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85 The authors quote Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Jones v. Davis, 8o6 F.3 d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Finally, Justice Breyer detailed with a range of population
measures the steep declines in executions and death sentences' (which
have declined even more since 20I5 ), as well as the increasing ten-
dency for death sentences and executions to concentrate geographical-
ly.8 9 Likewise, Justice Breyer acknowledged the Court's decision to
narrow the categories of offenders and offenses that could be consid-
ered death eligible and highlighted opinion polls indicating the public's
growing preference for life without the possibility of parole as opposed
to death (p. 269). All of these factors suggested to Justice Breyer that
the death penalty was on the way out. The Steikers take care to note
that these factors fit precisely into the "objective evidence" proportion-
ality prong (pp. 282-83) and thus lend support for their blueprint.
In their 1995 article, Sober Second Thoughts,90 the Steikers com-
pared the regulation of the death penalty to regulation in other consti-
tutional contexts, albeit on a substantially smaller scale than in Court-
ing Death (pp. 2 17-54). In both, they focused in particular on how
Furman compared to Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.91
To the Steikers, the most striking differences among these cases
concerned not legal issues so much as "extra-legal" issues. 9 2 For exam-
ple, the Court's striking down of death penalty laws in Furman only to
revitalize them four years later in Gregg "certainly fits the classic back-
lash story" (p. 2 I8). Yet the Steikers stress that the transition from
Furman to Gregg was nuanced, not simple, and was affected by a
range of factors (p. 2 19). In turn, "[m]any, though not all, of these fac-
tors were also observable to a degree" in Roe, which involved the
Court's broadening of abortion rights (p. 2 Ig). Roe and its aftermath,
too, are considered by some to be an illustration of the backlash theory
(p. 21g), although some scholars have questioned that view by docu-
menting that the hostility toward abortion existed before the Court in-
tervened (p. 223).
As the Steikers explain in Sober Second Thoughts, "[w]hat most
distinguishes Furman from Brown and Roe is the fact that capital
punishment is regulated entirely by legal procedures in the courtroom,
87 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
89 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2773-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 18.
91 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 18, at 404-12. In Courting Death,
the Steikers discuss in considerable detail how the Court's regulation of the death penalty "reveals
some generalizable features that can be observed in other contexts of constitutional regulation" (p.
217), including Roe (pp. 223-2 9).
92 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 18, at 404; see also supra note 82 (defining "extralegal").
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while education and abortion services necessarily implicate the partic-
ipation of extra-legal institutions."9 3  The Steikers stressed that such
differences illuminated the extent to which the Court could "trans-
form" the capital punishment process because "the constraints on the
Court that scholars have observed in the Brown and Roe contexts do
not map well onto the distinctive terrain of the death penalty." 9 4 Con-
trariwise, "the court-centered nature of capital punishment regulation
may also operate to limit the possibilities for doctrinal change" because
the Court may be loath to concede that its Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence was inadequate.9 5  Consequently, "the Court may doggedly
pursue a reformist agenda even in the face of compelling evidence of
failure."96
The Steikers do not return to these particular conclusions in their
book. Yet perhaps they should have. There is reason to argue that the
death penalty has come to rely on, and be influenced by, extralegal fac-
tors far more than in the past, indicating that the death penalty is not
nearly as "court-centered" as it once may have been. These factors
may also explain some of the Court's decisionmaking. The next Part
investigates these extralegal factors and developments that the Steikers
may have overlooked.
II. WHAT MORE THERE IS TO SAY
The richness of ideas and recommendations that Courting Death
offers provides an apt springboard for examining both the Steikers'
formidable arguments and other death penalty issues that the authors
do not cover in depth. This Part offers a different take on two of the
Steikers' major themes: (i) the tension between effecting meaningful
reform and legitimizing legal fagades; and (2) the future of the
American death penalty.
A. Genuine Reform or Legitimizing Fafade?
One of the Steikers' central themes is a criticism of the Court's
tendency, through its regulatory project, to paper over the problems
inherent in the system. But there is a different possible view of the ex-
tent to which reforms both endogenous and exogenous to the Court
have improved capital punishment. First, this section examines the
MPC and suggests it may have had a larger pre-Furman impact than
the Steikers acknowledge, and that it may have contributed to greater
uniformity among states - a positive development in the law. Second,
93 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 18, at 404.
94 Id.
9 Id.
96 Id.
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this section argues that the Court's regulatory project should be
viewed in light of the empirical unknown: what was the alternative
path the Court should have taken and where might we be if the Court
had followed it?
In addition to the Steikers' criticisms of the MPC's death penalty
provisions and the Court's efforts at regulation, there should be some
recognition that the ALI and the Court have done some things right.
Both institutions may also have chosen the best available path at the
time. While the Steikers do not suggest that the Court should have
avoided regulation altogether, their recommendations for either abol-
ishing or improving the death penalty pertain only to what the death
penalty looks like now, not how it looked after Gregg. Without speci-
fying the blueprint the Court should have followed in 1976, the
Steikers do not fully credit either the ALI or the Court with the regula-
tion that has been successful, and that can serve as a foundation for
future improvements.
j. The Model Penal Code's Death Penalty Provisions. - With
Gregg came the realization that abolition would not be possible within
the foreseeable future. When thirty-five states passed new capital
statutes after Furman, a number of them mandated death for every
capital offender. But most states selected a "guided-discretion" strate-
gy by adopting in whole or in part the MPC's death penalty provision,
section 2Io.6,97 which the ALI published in 19629" (pp. 60-63). The
MPC provision provided guidelines for states to follow along with
some important revisions to then-current death penalty law (p. 61).9
As the Steikers stress, however, there was an irony to the MPC provi-
sion's widespread marketability: the provision's adoption so soon after
Furman was decided seemingly fueled the Court's efforts to regulate
the death penalty process, while also entrenching and legitimizing it.
It would be decades before the ALI would even consider substan-
tially revising any provision in the MPC, much less the death penalty
provision. Finally, in 2002, the ALI initiated a project to revise the
outdated MPC sentencing provisions,1 00 an effort that remains on-
97 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 Io.6 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
98 See id.
99 The MPC provision applied only to murder, mandated that a sentencer select at least one of
eight "aggravating circumstances" (p. 61), and set up bifurcated proceedings consisting of a guilt
phase and a sentencing phase (pp. 61-62). See also infra notes nio-i6 and accompanying text
(discussing these contributions of the MPC provision).
100 See AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING: PLAN FOR REVISION (2002).
For a discussion of the impetus behind the revision effort and the plan for the proposed sentenc-
ing structure, see generally Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentenc-
ing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525 (2002).
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going 01 but that did not include a plan to reexamine section 21o.6.102
By 2007, however, two members of the ALI moved that the Institute
make a public statement that it was "opposed to capital punishment,"
a recommendation that the Institute wanted to consider after more
study and evaluation. 103 As a result, in 2009, the ALI published an
invited report by the Steikers concerning how the Institute should ap-
proach section 21o.6, especially given the provision's datedness and
problematic history.10 4 The report sought to answer whether the ALI
should withdraw the provision, reform it, leave it alone, or provide
some alternative corrective.
In their report, the Steikers emphasize the extent to which states
have relied on MPC section 2 Io.6 and the fact that the Court has tried
to regulate the death penalty "largely on" the MPC's model.10 5 While
the Steikers note in their report 0 6 and in their book (pp. 43-44) that
the Court and other entities "ignored" the MPC provision for the first
decade after its publication and before Furman (1962-1972), that char-
acterization is somewhat misleading given the circumstances of the
time. The United States' near-decade-long execution moratorium
started in 1967,107 just five years after the MPC provision was released
and when the LDF strategy was in operation. Executions and death
sentences were rare and rapidly on the decline; there would have been
little incentive for states or the Court to go looking for a new provision
to adopt (indeed, the ALI Advisory Committee had wanted to abolish
the death penalty but the Council considered it politically unfeasi-
ble 1 s). The fact that the MPC provision was adopted so quickly and
widely after Furman indicates the broad reach of the ALI's influence
at the time when a death penalty provision was most needed.
If the states had not had MPC section 2 Io.6 available in 1976, it is
difficult to predict what they would have otherwise done. Perhaps
more states would have taken the option of instituting a mandatory
death penalty, or they would have devised another set - or multiple
sets - of guidelines of variable effectiveness, thereby enabling even
greater nationwide differences among states.
The age of the MPC provision as well as its lack of revisions until
recently can make it easy to forget that the provision had initially of-
101 A fourth tentative draft was submitted to the ALI in 20I6. See Am. LAW INST., MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING: TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4 (2016).
102 ALI 200g REPORT, supra note Ig, annex B at i.
103 Id.
104 Id
105 Id. at 3.
106 Id. at 4.
107 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
108 See ALI 200g REPORT, supra note ig, annex C:I at 6 (Roger S. Clark & Ellen S. Podgor,
Model Penal Code: Sentencing: Motion on Capital Punishment (Apr. 2, 2007)).
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fered some groundbreaking changes to death penalty doctrine.10 9
First, the MPC provision pertained only to murder and not to rape,
helping to set the stage for Coker's elimination of adult rape from
death eligibility (p. 61).110 Second, the MPC provision required that at
least one of eight "aggravating circumstances" be selected before a de-
fendant could be considered death eligible, thereby representing the
ALI's effort to narrow the relevant pool of defendants to those who
were the most violent.' While the MPC aggravating factor concern-
ing whether "[tihe murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel"1 1 2
was vague and overbroad - and later rendered unconstitutional un-
less state courts applied their own limiting constructions 1 3 - the pro-
vision's other aggravating factors have the kind of objectivity that the
Steikers cite in their list of recommendations for changing current
death penalty doctrine (p. 177).114 Lastly, the MPC introduced the
109 A parallel argument can be made with respect to the sexual offense provisions of MPC sec-
tion 2 13. These provisions, which are highly outdated but are now undergoing revision by the
ALI, had initially offered modernized understandings of sexual behavior, particularly same-sex
behavior, when they were first introduced in 1962. See Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal
Code's Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled and Replaced, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
207, 207-13 (2003); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AM. L.
INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/ [https://perma.cc
/ULAg-L8YX].
110 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-6oo (1977) (plurality opinion); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2IO.6(I) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
111 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 21o.6(3).
112 Id. § 21o.6(3 )(h).
113 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (rg8o) ("[T]he validity of the petitioner's death
sentences turns on whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of the murders that he was
convicted of committing, the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional
construction of the phrase 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] in-
volved . . . depravity of mind . . .' We conclude that the answer must be no. . . . [I]t 'is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence
be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."' (first quoting GA. CODE
§ 27-2534.1 (b)(7) (1978); then quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1973))).
114 Section 2 ro.6 provides, in relevant part:
§ 2 IO.6. Sentence of Death for Murder; Further Proceedings to Determine Sentence.
(3) Aggravating Circumstances.
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony in-
volving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another
murder.
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accom-
plice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or at-
tempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of
force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
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type of bifurcated proceedings that the LDF had attempted to con-
vince the Court to require in McGautha v. California,'15 albeit unsuc-
cessfully (p. 6]).116 Bifurcated proceedings are one of the major fea-
tures that distinguish death penalty cases from other kinds of cases,
and the MPC's adoption of them was a landmark move.
Ultimately the Steikers - and hence the ALI - recommended
withdrawing the MPC provision"' for two reasons. First, certain as-
pects of the provision had already been ruled unconstitutional, in par-
ticular the aggravating factor (in the absence of an appropriate con-
struction) of "[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel."" Second, the provision was "simply inadequate to address the
endemic flaws of the current system," especially because "its adoption
rested on the false assumption that carefully-worded guidance to capi-
tal sentencers would meaningfully limit arbitrariness and discrimina-
tion in the administration of the American death penalty."1 19 Similar-
ly, the ALI concluded that it would also not take on any projects to
reform section 21Io.6.120 Not only had other organizations already
committed to studying the death penalty on the state and national lev-
el, 1 2 1 but the Steikers also noted that the death penalty had proven
immune to reform in most jurisdictions. 1 2 2 If the ALI once again tried
to reform the process, "it would run the risk not merely of failing to
improve the death penalty, but also of helping to entrench or legitimate
it."1123 Indeed, to some scholars the provisions "have become . . . 'a
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional
depravity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 IO.6.
115 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
116 Id. at 22 1 ("It may well be, as the American Law Institute and the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws have concluded, that bifurcated trials and criteria for jury sen-
tencing discretion are superior means of dealing with capital cases if the death penalty is to be
retained at all. But the Federal Constitution, which marks the limits of our authority in these
cases, does not guarantee trial procedures that are the best of all worlds .... From a constitution-
al standpoint we cannot conclude that it is impermissible for a State to consider that the compas-
sionate purposes of jury sentencing in capital cases are better served by having the issues of guilt
and punishment determined in a single trial than by focusing the jury's attention solely on pun-
ishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.").
117 ALI 200g REPORT, supra note ig, at 6 (Report of the Council); see also id. annex B at 8
(recommending that the Institute refrain from attempting to reform the provision and instead
withdraw it).
118 MODEL PENAL CODE §2 IO.6( 3 )(h); see also Godfrey, 446 U.S at 432-33 (198o) (plurality
opinion).
119 ALI 200g REPORT, supra note ig, annex B at 7.
120 Id. at 6 (Report of the Council) ("The Council reports that there are no plans to begin an
ALI project to draft language that would revise or replace § 2Io.6 or otherwise address the sub-
ject of capital punishment.").
121 Id. annex B at 3.
122 Id. at 4.
123 Id. at 5.
2017]1 I855
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
paradigm of constitutional permissibility,' a lifeline for the retention of
capital punishment against constitutional attack." 1 2 4 The Steikers ar-
gued that no revision of a statutory provision could cure the problems
with capital punishment. 1 2 5
But the ALI's decision leaves the status of the death penalty in an
odd position with respect to reform efforts. There is an argument to
be made that this "ostrich" approach is a dangerous tack and one that
banks too heavily on the estimated speed and certainty of abolition
while leaving capital defendants vulnerable. As the Steikers note, a
major reason for the Court's regulation was a need to curtail judicial
and jury discretion due to racial justice concerns. 1 2 6  For the ALI to
simply remove section 2 Io.6 without doing more leaves the ALI no
longer involved with the death penalty in any major capacity, a status
that could continue for decades to come.
2. The "Compared to What?" Question and the Court's Regulatory
Successes. - The empirical unknown - the "compared to what?"
question - makes it hard to assess the impact of the Court's regulato-
ry project. The Steikers do not provide a scenario of what would have
happened had the Court refrained from its regulatory efforts or had it
become only partially involved. There is some cause to believe the re-
sults could have been much worse: after all, a post-Furman President
Richard Nixon desired the death penalty's return (pp. 49, 6a), and
crime rates were rising sharply (pp. oo-oi).
Alternatively, perhaps, the impact of regulation was not as egre-
gious as the Steikers' account might suggest. For example, Professor
David McCord's statistical study testing some of the Steikers' conten-
tions suggests that the Court's impact was more favorable than the
Steikers claim: "The best available evidence shows that the Court's
regulatory death penalty jurisprudence has been successful in decreas-
ing overinclusion [especially with respect to racial bias], which is the
primary vice that the Court has seen in death penalty systems for the
last quarter of a century." 1 2 7 While the Steikers do offer recommenda-
124 Id. annex C:I at 5 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2IO.6, at 17 1
(AM. LAW INST. 1980)).
125 Id. annex B at 5.
126 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text; see also David McCord, Judging the Effec-
tiveness of the Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own Goals:
Mild Success or Major Disaster?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545, 548 (1997) ("[T]he Court has had
only one primary goal for its regulation of capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion, with par-
ticular interest in minimizing invidious overinclusion due to racial bias.").
127 McCord, supra note 126, at 593. The Steikers note the overinclusion problem is related "at
a general conceptual level" to the arbitrariness problem: "Overinclusion (the execution of a de-
fendant in the absence of expressed legislative will) treats the defendant more harshly than he de-
serves, whereas underinclusion (the failure to execute some other defendants in the presence of
expressed legislative will) treats other defendants more leniently than they deserve." Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 18, at 366.
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tions in their book for ways to improve the Court's regulation of the
death penalty (pp. 176-87), they stress that, even with repair, legal
regulation is not likely the answer to the death penalty's ongoing prob-
lems of "arbitrariness, discrimination, inefficacy, and error" (p. 177).
Yet the Steikers downplay or perhaps do not sufficiently ac-
knowledge some of the Court's successes at regulation. Part of the dif-
ficulty in assessing these successes is that the Steikers tend to shift the
goalposts designating what constitutes adequate death penalty reform
without offering a full explanation for why and how the goalposts
move over time. The proportionality doctrine is a particularly apt ex-
ample. The Steikers select the Court's proportionality doctrine as their
vehicle of choice for their "blueprint for constitutional abolition"
(pp. 271-72) because of the advances the Court has made in that
realm; 128 at the same time, they curiously disregard the extent of its
overall impact or why it reflects a positive outcome of the Court's reg-
ulation. This stance is especially noticeable given the Steikers' discus-
sion of proportionality in Sober Second Thoughts.129 There, in 11995,
the Steikers stressed the detrimental aspects of the Court's continuing
inclusion of juvenile offenders and intellectually disabled offenders as
death eligible even though both groups represented only a minimal
proportion of homicide offenders1 30 : "[A]llowing states to seek the
death penalty against all offenders in these categories presents a real
and substantial danger that many offenders will be selected for execu-
tion who do not 'deserve' it . "131 Despite the Court's changing
stance on these and other categories during the two decades following
Sober Second Thoughts, however, the Steikers fail to step back and
evaluate - in light of their regulation theory - the nature, speed, and
extent of the positive direction in which the Court was heading, and
why. As the Steikers put it, "[n]o longer can death be imposed for the
crime of rape, or against juveniles or persons with intellectual disabil-
ity, but beyond that, the state can seek the death penalty against virtu-
ally any murderer" (pp. 175-76). The "beyond that" language in their
sentence represents a moving of the goalposts substantially further
away from where the Steikers had set them in 1995.
Yet the Court's exclusion of those categories has made major in-
roads into reducing the number of individuals who are death eligi-
ble. 13 2  The Steikers acknowledge that the Court's 1977 ruling in
128 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
129 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 18, at 417-18.
130 See id. at 417.
131 Id. at 417-18.
132 Studies of death row populations suggest that before Atkins and Roper, the number of now-
excluded offenders was significant. See Robert J. Smith, Sophie Cull & Zoe Robinson, The Fail-
ure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1221, 1231 (2014) (noting that in the authors' study of con-
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Coker v. Georgia, which prohibited the death penalty for the rape of an
adult woman,1 3 3 "seemed promising for the future of constitutional
regulation" because it narrowed defendants' death eligibility in a way
that aggravating factors could not (p. 163). They also acknowledge
that the Court broadened the net of Coker even further when, over
three decades later, it prohibited the death penalty for child rape
(p. 164).134 This decision foreclosed the death penalty "for any non-
homicidal offense against persons" (distinguishing nonhomicidal crimes
such as treason or terrorism, which are crimes against the state)
(p. 164). Likewise, these exclusion cases were decided within a six-year
span of time (from 2002 to 2008), a marked achievement for a Court
that forestalled imposing proportionality for some decades after Coker
(p. 163).135 Indeed, if regulation were working as it should, one would
expect death sentences and executions to decline as they have been -
presumably because the system is selecting only the "worst of the
worst." Given these trends in proportionality doctrine, then, it can be
challenging at times to decipher whether regulation is a failure or a
tepid success.
Granted, bright-line proportionality limits (those for juveniles, for
example) are easier to evaluate than the murkier categories (such as in-
tellectual disability), which have engendered continuing litigation to
establish clear boundaries. 1 36 That said, if the Court continues incor-
porating "extralegal" issues and institutions1 37 into its decisionmaking
as it has in recent decades, it must increase its scientific sophistication
to avoid, to the extent possible, needless error and protracted litigation.
Whether the Court is evaluating intellectual disability 1 3  or juvenile
culpability, 13 9 DNA evidencel4o or lethal injection,141 the Court has
demned inmates, 15% had IQ scores that were less than eighty and half of that group had scores
that were in the sixties); VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY:
DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY I, 1973-
FEBRUARY 28, 2005, at 3 (2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/juvdeathstreib.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DLS9-BPR6] (noting that, of the 949 inmates executed from 1973 to 2005, twen-
ty-two, or 2.3%, were juveniles).
1433 U.S. 584, 592 (Ig7).
134 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
135 See, e.g., id. (describing the Court's limited proportionality-based regulation in Coker's af-
termath).
136 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing Hall and Moore).
137 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of extralegal
issues into other areas of constitutional regulation).
138 See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (rejecting Texas's use of antiquat-
ed factors in determining if an inmate was intellectually disabled and therefore death ineligible).
139 See generally Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379 (2006) (contending that some of the social science and psychological
research in Roper is outdated).
140 See infra notes 143, 150-54 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 175-77, I82 and accompanying text.
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shown many times over that it has work to do to master such extra-
legal capabilities.
There is a genuine debate about the extent to which various actors
should engage in regulation or reform efforts and whether such efforts
legitimate capital punishment and therefore frustrate abolition. While
the Steikers emphasize the ultimate effects on abolition, others might
argue that reform should be pursued regardless of its purported legiti-
mating effect. The promise of future abolition is cold comfort to the
capital defendant denied protection today.
B. Independent Drivers of Reform and Nudges to Abolition
The Steikers' regulation argument is all-encompassing, and there-
fore has the potential to obscure key contributors to the death penal-
ty's decline that extend beyond its regulation by the Supreme Court.
This section looks at two factors that may have profound effects on the
future of the American death penalty: (I) the emergence of unforesee-
able exogenous variables similar to the introduction of DNA evidence
into criminal trials in 1g80s; and (2) pressure points that exist largely
outside of the constitutional regulatory framework, such as lethal in-
jection litigation.
j. Unforeseeable Exogenous Variables. - Seemingly no factor has
had greater sway on the decline of executions starting in 1999 than the
"DNA revolution" and the accompanying surge in evidence of wrong-
ful convictions.1 42 Yet there is no clear evidence that the use of DNA
in the courtroom was a byproduct of federal constitutional regulation
of the death penalty Rather it seems to be mostly, if not entirely, a
byproduct of scientific advances and, only concomitantly, the increas-
ing use of expert testimony and superior lawyering.
Before 1990 the public reacted little to news about wrongful con-
victions (pp. 207-O8).143 Pre-DNA innocence claims could always be
questioned because of the nature and weakness of the study upon
which they were based. 144 Yet 1989 marked a turning point when, for
the first time in the United States, a prisoner who had been convicted
of rape a decade earlier was exonerated by postconviction DNA test-
ing.1 4 5 DNA evidence would begin to offer the promise of showing
with substantially greater certainty that defendants were innocent.146
142 Cf BANNER, supra note 9, at 304 ("The prospect of killing an innocent person seemed to be
the one thing that could cause people to rethink their support for capital punishment.").
143 See Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole, Science and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, and
the Debate over Capital Punishment in the United States, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 603, 605,
6o8-ro (2009) (noting that before the advent of DNA evidence in criminal cases, inmates' claims
of innocence were never entirely provable).
144 See id. at 6o8-ro.
145 Id. at 61o.
146 Id. at 6II.
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This legal awakening would bolster the credibility of even non-DNA
death row exonerations.1 47 By 1996, sixty-five people had been cleared
by DNA testing, with a National Institute of Justice report detailing
these cases. 1 4 8
In 2000, the founders of Cardozo Law School's Innocence Project,
along with a journalist, published the book Actual Innocence, which
described the cases they handled and presented their strong and heated
critique of the American criminal justice system. 1 4 9 While most of the
cases in the book were not death penalty cases and most of the exoner-
ations post-Gregg occurred by methods other than DNA, those capital
DNA exonerations had, and continue to have, a lasting and powerful
effect on the death penalty's legitimacy.1 5 0  Indeed, both Justice
Stevens and Justice Breyer emphasized in particular a concern over
the potential to execute innocent inmates in their anti-death penalty
decisions in, respectively, Baze v. Rees1 5 1 and Glossip v. Gross.1 5 2 For
Justice Breyer, the execution of the innocent is one of three "funda-
mental constitutional defects" of the death penalty's administration
(p. 267).151
According to the Steikers, "the innocence issue . . . is fairly viewed
as a foreseeable by-product of the Court's regulatory efforts [because]
[t]he Court's regulation fueled the creation of a new set of institutional
actors committed to capital defense" (pp. 209-lo). While the Court's
regulation may have led to superior lawyering, the development of
DNA science and evidence is also clearly an exogenous variable, one
that was unforeseeable to the legal world and that exerted tremendous
influence on the rate of capital punishment in America. It was not un-
til 1985 that DNA technology played a crucial role in criminal investi-
gation, 1 5 4 and, as mentioned, most of the innocence claims at the start
were not capital cases. The fact that attorneys such as Barry Scheck
147 Id
148 Id. at 6Io.
149 Id.; see BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2003); see also Barry C.
Scheck, Barry Scheck Lectures on Wrongful Convictions, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 597, 600-04 (2006)
(discussing the "165 postconviction DNA exonerations in the United States" at the time of the
2005 lecture, id. at 600, a number that had grown to 175 by 2006, id. n.4).
150 Aronson & Cole, supra note 143, at 61o-ii.
1553 U.S. 35, 85-86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
152 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755-59 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is significantly more
research-based evidence today indicating that courts sentence to death individuals who may well
be actually innocent or whose convictions (in the law's view) do not warrant the death penalty's
application." Id. at 2759.).
153 Id. at 2755-56.
154 Aronson & Cole, supra note 143, at 61o. Although "the first American prisoner to be cleared
by postconviction DNA testing" was exonerated in 1985, he was only paroled at that time. Id. It
was not until 1989 that the conviction was removed from his record. Id.
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and Peter Neufeld became sufficiently expert to use the evidence in
criminal and capital cases is a credit not only to the ingenuity of the
defense bar, but also to the growing numbers of scientists and special-
ists who became involved as a result of the impact of DNA testing on
criminal convictions.
In sum, an argument can be made that one factor that has had a
strong effect on decreasing executions starting in 1999 may well have
had little or no association with constitutional regulation of the death
penalty. Furthermore, DNA cases have the backing of science, sug-
gesting that the death penalty, like other constitutional contexts, has
become more extralegal.
Indeed, there are other independent variables that may, with time,
start to approximate the impact of DNA evidence, most notably those
measures that fall under the broad rubric of "neuroscience," defined as
"the branch of the life sciences that studies the brain and nervous sys-
tem."1 5 5 Neuroscience evidence can include both brain imaging tech-
niques (such as an MRI or PET scan) and nonimaging techniques
(such as paper and pencil tests of intelligence). 1 5 6 Such measures were
critical to the Court's evaluation of the culpability of juvenile offend-
ers in a range of cases, 1 5 including Roper v. Simmons. 1 5  In addition,
this burgeoning field of science can contribute to attempts to narrow
the range of defendants rendered eligible for the death penalty, thereby
contributing to proportionality-based efforts to exclude the severely
mentally ill from consideration. Research has also shown that capital
defendants are more likely to win claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel if their attorneys failed to introduce relevant neuroscience
evidence on their behalf or introduced the wrong kind of evidence or
expert. 159
As measures of the human brain and behavior become more
sophisticated, they will play an increasingly important role in litiga-
tion. Other kinds of extralegal factors have also profoundly shaped le-
thal injection litigation, which itself has played a central role in mold-
ing today's death penalty system.
155 NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 206
(Brent Garland ed., 2004).
156 Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuro-
science Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 505 (2015).
157 See generally Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions About Adolescents' Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 513
(2013) (discussing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(20IO); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988));
see also generally Denno, supra note 139, at 381-96 (discussing the support the Court used for its
decision in Roper, including briefs examining scientific research on topics including neuroscience).
1543 U.S. at 569-70.
159 See Denno, supra note 156, at 5o6-ii.
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2. Lethal Injection Litigation.
(a) Backdrop. - After Gregg, many states were concerned about
implementing electrocution, long considered a problematic form of ex-
ecution due to a number of highly publicized and gruesomely botched
electrocutions. 16 0 As a result, lethal injection was first adopted by
Oklahoma in 1977 upon the recommendations of two physicians who
created a three-drug lethal injection protocol consisting of the follow-
ing: (I) a barbiturate anesthetic that would induce unconsciousness
(sodium thiopental); (2) a total muscle relaxant that would paralyze an
individual's voluntary muscles (pancuronium bromide); and (3) a toxin
that would induce cardiac arrest (potassium chloride). This method
was supposed to put an inmate to death easily and humanely, with the
appearance of merely falling asleep. 161
A large cluster of states quickly adopted lethal injection as their
sole or primary mode of execution, even before the first lethal injection
execution ever took place. It was not until 2009, however, that every
death penalty state in the country used lethal injection either as its sole
execution method or as one of two execution methods (along with elec-
trocution, lethal gas, hanging, or the firing squad). 162 Yet, from the
first lethal injection execution in 1982163 to one of the most recent exe-
cutions in 2017,164 lethal injection has been an egregious method of ex-
ecution that has only worsened over time.
With rare exception, lethal injection has not been subject to the
Court's top-down regulation of states through the enforcement of fed-
160 See generally RICHARD MORAN, EXECUTIONER'S CURRENT (2002) (discussing the his-
tory and development of the electric chair and the botched electrocution of William Kemmler);
AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY 179-2 10 (2014) (archiving botched executions, including by electrocution, from r8go to
20IO); Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The
Engineering of Death over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994) (detailing
botched electrocution executions); Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions [https://perma
.cc/KN6T-GE43] (providing examples of the more familiar botched executions from 1982 to 2016).
161 See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Dismantled the
Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 65-70 (2007).
162 See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1341-43
(2014).
163 See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV.
319, 428-29 (1997) (discussing the execution of Charles Brooks, Jr., by lethal injection).
164 See Rachel Weiner, Ricky Gray's Execution Took More than 30 Minutes. His Attorneys
Want to Know Why., WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public
-safety/ricky-grays-execution-took-more-than-3o-minutes-his-attorneys-want-to-know-why/20I 7
/o/Ig/89233530-de63-Ine6-ad42-f33 75f27lCgcstory.html [https://perma.cc/LG6U-3HJZ] (stating
that the execution of Ricky Gray exceeded half an hour and was partially hidden from view be-
cause executioners faced challenges inserting an intravenous line).
1862 [Vol. 130:I827
COURTING ABOLITION
eral constitutional law. 165 Rather, all execution statutes, including le-
thal injection statutes, have been state created, with the exception of
the Federal Death Penalty Act. 16 6 My examination of all lethal injec-
tion statutes in the country shows that there are six main types; 16
state legislatures often share information and approaches and therefore
influence one another as they change from one method of execution to
the next. From the late i8oos to the present, states commonly fol-
lowed one another in a pattern, changing execution methods in the
same general direction and order, from hanging to electrocution to le-
thal gas and then lethal injection. 168  As my two surveys (in 2001 and
2005) of all lethal injection protocols in all death penalty states
showed, lethal injection protocols were deficient and lacking in nu-
merous ways, however, ranging from the types and amounts of lethal
injection drugs given to inmates, to the paltry selection, training, and
qualifications of the lethal injection teams and the lack of medical
oversight. 169
Indeed, century-long efforts by departments of corrections to seek
the contributions of physicians, nurses, and other medical personnel in
executions have demonstrated mixed results in terms of quality and
accountability. While much of the involvement of medical personnel
has been covert given the professional repercussions that could result,
there is substantial evidence that physicians and other medical profes-
sionals have long participated in the development and application of
methods of execution. 17 0 At the same time, the presence of doctors or
medical personnel does not ensure a humane execution. For example,
in the incident that spurred Glossip - Clayton Lockett's terribly
botched 2014 execution in Oklahoma - both a doctor and an emer-
165 The two exceptions are Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion); and Glossip v.
Gross, '35 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), in which the Court rejected challenges to state lethal injection
protocols.
166 18 U.S.C. H§ 3591-3598 (2012).
167 See Denno, supra note 163, at 409-II.
168 Id. at 364-70, 373-75; Deborah W Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Trou-
bling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About
Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 90-125 (2002).
169 Denno, supra note 168, at 116-25 (discussing the survey conducted in 2001); see Denno, su-
pra note 161, at gi-ror (discussing the survey conducted in 2005).
170 See AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS ET AL., BREACH OF TRUST PHYSICIAN PARTICIPA-
TION IN EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (1994) ("In the course of our research, we
found that physicians are involved in all methods of executions, especially ones performed by le-
thal injection, in violation of professional ethical guidelines."); see generally Ty Alper, The Role of
State Medical Boards in Regulating Physician Participation in Executions, J. MED. LICENSURE
& DISCIPLINE, Fall 2009, at l6, 18; Denno, supra note 163, at 412-38; Deborah W Denno, The
Firing Squad as "A Known and Available Alternative Method of Execution" Post-Glossip, 49
MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 769-7o (2016).
18632017]1
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
gency medical technician attempted to infuse Lockett with drugs in a
situation that suggested gross incompetence."'
Moreover, doctors' ethical obligations can unexpectedly interact
with legal dictates in ways that preclude their participation in execu-
tions. This clash was evident in Morales v. Hickman.17 2 In Morales, a
federal judge ordered California either to provide Michael Morales
with qualified medical personnel who could ensure he was unconscious
during his execution, or to allow the Department of Corrections to give
one drug rather than the typical protocol of three drugs. 1 3  While the
state chose to have the medical personnel present, both doctors re-
signed hours before the scheduled execution because their court-
ordered roles conflicted with their ethical responsibilities. 17 4 This inci-
dent led to California's 2006 stalemate on executions. Thus, while
helpful in some cases, medical professionals generally would not neces-
sarily provide the extralegal remedy that lethal injection needs to sur-
vive without warranted scrutiny.
(b) Impact. - By 2007, there were so many legal challenges to the
constitutionality of the three-drug protocol - particularly targeting
the pain inflicted when the barbiturate fails to render the inmate un-
conscious - that states had trouble carrying out executions. The
Court ultimately tried to resolve this uncertainty in Baze v. Rees,
where it rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to Kentucky's
three-drug lethal injection protocol.17 5 As the Baze Court explained,
the petitioners failed to show that Kentucky's protocol created a "sub-
stantial risk of serious harm" or "an 'objectively intolerable risk of
harm"' 17 6 to the inmate compared to "known and available alterna-
tive[]" methods of execution.17 7
Ironically, within a year of Baze, a national shortage of sodium thi-
opental - the crucial first drug in the three-drug protocol - began to
affect every death penalty state's ability to carry out lethal injection.178
States scrambled for a substitute either domestically or from abroad,
171 See Cary Aspinwall & Ziva Branstetter, Records Reveal Lack of Protocol in Clayton Lock-
ett's Oklahoma Execution, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 16, 2015, 11:47 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com
/homepagelatest/records-reveal-lack-of-protocol-in-clayton-lockett-s-oklahoma/article-e4fI 7853
-16Oc-53oa-gf36-928aofdgf6O5.html [https://perma.cc/2P8M-4ZR3] (documenting that both a par-
amedic and a doctor were attempting to locate a vein on Lockett and to start an IV for his lethal
injection).
172 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
173 Id. at 1047; Denno, supra note 161, at 51-53.
174 Denno, supra note 161, at 51-53. For a fuller discussion of Morales and its aftermath see
infra note 199.
17553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion).
176 Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)); id. (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 846).
177 Id. at 61.
178 Denno, supra note 170, at 765-69.
11864 [Vol. 130:I827
COURTING ABOLITION
particularly in European countries. Yet, not only did European
sources of lethal injection drugs run dry, but also the FDA ultimately
prohibited the importation of lethal injection drugs from all coun-
tries.17 9 States next began adopting a number of different substitutes
for lethal injection drugs, creating a multitude of protocols.18 0 Because
all of these drugs were made for healing, arguments were made that
their use in bringing about death was essentially experimental. 1
In 2015, seven years after Baze had validated the original three-
drug protocol, the issue of drug substitutes came to the Court in
Glossip v. Gross. The Glossip Court upheld Oklahoma's use of a con-
troversial drug (midazolam), concluding that it did not create "a sub-
stantial risk of severe pain" and that petitioners failed to "identify a
known and available alternative method of execution that entails a
lesser risk of pain, a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-
execution claims." 1 8 2
Both Baze and Glossip have hardly sapped the ongoing strength of
lethal injection litigation. As my research has shown, because of the
drug shortages, Baze was greatly weakened as precedent - in essence,
the decision upholds a lethal injection protocol that relies on one drug
that is no longer available. Conversely, Glossip upholds the use of a
controversial lethal injection drug that many states still will not use
despite the Supreme Court's stamp of approval. While lethal injection
litigation has continued full force, it is clear that the medical profession
and, increasingly, pharmaceutical companies are the prime extralegal
institutions that help steer the litigation's direction.
The Steikers credit "[s]ome of the decline" in executions to chal-
lenges associated with lethal injection litigation, most particularly be-
cause of drug shortages and problematic injection protocols (pp. 212-
13). Yet the Death Penalty Information Center's (DPIC) 1 3 year-end
179 Id.; see also Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3 d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("The FDA acted in derogation of
[its] duties by permitting the importation of thiopental, a concededly misbranded and unapproved
new drug, and by declaring that it would not in the future sample and examine foreign shipments
of the drug despite knowing they may have been prepared in an unregistered establishment.").
180 Denno, supra note 162, at 1380.
181 For discussions of how the lethal injection drug shortage led to experimentation with exe-
cuting inmates, see Glossip v. Gross, '35 S. Ct. 2726, 2789-91, 2796 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing); Brief for the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12-25, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14-7955); Ty
Alper, The United States Execution Drug Shortage: A Consequence of Our Values, BROWN J.
WORLD AFE, Fall 2014, at 27, 31, 36; and James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty
Drugs and the International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1229-36, 1273-74 (2015).
See also generally Seema K. Shah, Experimental Execution, go WASH. L. REV. 147 (2015); Paul
Litton, On the Argument that Execution Protocol Reform Is Biomedical Research, go WASH. L.
REV. ONLINE 87 (2015).
182 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (citing Baze, 553 U.S. at 61 (plurality opinion)).
183 The DPIC is a national nonprofit organization that provides the media and public with re-
ports and information on a variety of death penalty topics.
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report for 2016 makes a substantially stronger statement about lethal
injection's role. It attributes the past year's execution decline not only
to the growing "geographic isolation and outlier application" of the
death penalty, but also "unquestionably" to the American pharmaceu-
tical industry's efforts "to prevent states from obtaining their medi-
cines for use in executions." 18 4  In addition, the report notes that
European Union human rights regulations and actions by the FDA to
prevent illegal importation of execution drugs also have contributed to
the decline in executions.18 5 The DPIC report provides no other ex-
planations for the decline.
The impact of lethal injection litigation on the decrease in execu-
tions and on public opinion regarding the death penalty generally has
been evident for over a decade and started before the problems with
drug shortages. According to Richard Dieter, former executive direc-
tor of the DPIC, lethal injection challenges have had a major influence
on derailing and preventing executions. Writing in 2008, Dieter noted
that such challenges "have already held up more executions, and for a
longer time than appeals involving such broad issues as race, inno-
cence, and mental competency."18 6
Dieter made this observation right after the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Baze, the Court's first constitutional review of a state's le-
thal injection protocol, but seven years before Glossip, the Court's se-
cond such case. While Dieter's commentary indicates that lethal injec-
tion litigation substantially hindered states' abilities to execute nearly a
decade ago, that influence has become only more pronounced with
each passing year, as the statistics for 2016 indicate. Lethal injection
litigation potentially involves every capital defendant who is facing
death, whereas other types of litigation pertain only to discrete groups
of individuals - juveniles, those with intellectual disabilities, and so
on. Thus, based on numbers alone, lethal injection litigation has a
substantially wider reach.
Perhaps because of the expansiveness of their project and their fo-
cus on death eligibility, the Steikers do not discuss lethal injection liti-
gation extensively. But the litigation - which exists largely outside
the constitutional regulatory framework - has itself had a markedly
destabilizing effect on the death penalty and will likely remain one of
the most critical influences on its future.
(c) State and Local Control. - The administration of all execution
methods, including lethal injection, has primarily been a matter of
184 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note I, at 5.
185 Id.
186 Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Penalty
in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 789 (2008) (noting that legal challenges like
that in Baze had "resulted in executions being placed on hold for nearly six months").
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state and local, rather than national, regulation.18 7  Accordingly, exam-
ining state regulation of execution methods, particularly lethal injec-
tion, might help to flesh out the Steikers' regulatory argument. Lethal
injection challenges present an alternative to the Steikers' vision of a
Furman II route to the abolition of the death penalty, one of the "mul-
tiple possible paths to the same destination" that they acknowledge
(p. 2 7 1).
The Court's relative lack of oversight concerning execution proce-
dures is striking because, as the Steikers note, the earliest and most
frequent constitutional challenges involved execution methods (p. 26).
While the Court did review late-nineteenth-century challenges con-
cerning the firing squad and electrocution, these cases focused on is-
sues other than whether such methods were cruel and unusual under
federal constitutional law." Indeed, it was not until 1962 that the
Eighth Amendment was even applied to the states.18 9 Thus, as I have
argued elsewhere, the Court did not engage in a full constitutional as-
sessment of any method of execution in this country until 2008, when
it decided Baze, and then only because challenges to lethal injection
protocols were impeding the execution process.19 0
187 David Garland's insightful account of the U.S. death penalty, including execution methods,
emphasizes in particular state and local historical and contemporary influences. See DAVID
GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLI-
TION 32-38 (2010).
188 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not
apply to the states and deferring to the assessment of the New York legislature that electrocution
was not a cruel and unusual punishment); Wilkerson v. Utah, gg U.S. 130, '37 (1878) (holding
that the trial court was authorized to pass a death sentence that required the plaintiff to be pub-
licly shot even though the method of execution was not specified by statute). In Wilkerson, the
Court determined in dicta only that shooting does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See 99
U.S. at 134-35. Indeed, the petitioner never raised the cruelty of shooting but rather challenged
the application of a Utah statute authorizing a death sentence for first-degree murder. See id. at
131, 136-37 ("Had the statute prescribed the mode of executing the sentence, it would have been
the duty of the court to follow it, unless the punishment to be inflicted was cruel and unusual,
within the meaning of the eighth amendment to the Constitution, which is not pretended by the
counsel for the prisoner." Id. at 136-37.); see also Denno, supra note 170, at 761-62 (discussing
Wilkerson in the context of Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)). Likewise, In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890), did not determine electrocution to be constitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment, even though courts have relied on Kemmler to dismiss challenges to the constitutionality of
electrocution. See Denno, supra note 16o, at 616-23 (providing an analysis of all cases from 18go
to 1993, totaling to 226, that cited Kemmler and showing that state and federal courts regularly
refer to Kemmler to counter petitioners' arguments that electrocution (as well as the other four
methods of execution) are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual methods of punishment).
189 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666-67 (1962).
190 Denno, supra note 162, at 1344-45. For discussions of how challenges to lethal injection
protocols impeded the execution process, see Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91 WASH. L. REV. 929,
938-39 (2016); and Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Enter the Debate over Lethal Injection, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2007), http://nytimes.com/2007/O9/26/washington/26lethal.html [https://perma.cc
/9 ZB8-AMED].
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There are a number of reasons, both historic and cultural, why ex-
ecution methods have not been subject to concerted national regula-
tion. First, legislatures and courts delegate nearly all responsibility for
the organization and implementation of execution methods to prison
officials, who often lack the expertise in this area to justify such a
wide-ranging delegation of authority.1 91 This "down-top" process is
facilitated by vague and ill-defined lethal injection statutes as well as
courts that err on the side of endorsing the death penalty and dismiss-
ing execution methods claims, particularly those targeting lethal injec-
tion. 1 9 2  As the Steikers emphasize, in order for regulations to work,
they must filter through various governmental organizations and indi-
viduals spanning from legislatures to different levels of courts and then
down to prison officials and personnel (pp. 117-18). This complex,
trickle-down system, however, can be marked by confusing stop-and-
go signs and influenced by varying cultural forces across different
states. Yet execution methods remain in the basement tier, thereby
providing prison officials with an inordinate degree of discretion in
how they will implement an execution protocol.
Second, until Baze, the Court had never reviewed evidence con-
cerning the constitutionality of any method of execution under the
Eighth Amendment, a circumstance that left states to continue to act
on their own. Prior to Baze, the Court had granted certiorari in two
cases challenging the use of electrocution and lethal gas, but both were
mooted when the states revised their statutes to adopt lethal injection
as their execution method.1 9 3  And in the first thirty years that states
used lethal injection for executions, the Court declined to review a le-
thal injection case under the Eighth Amendment. 1 9 4 The Court resist-
ed getting involved in execution methods, seemingly believing that del-
egating the responsibility to the states, and hence state departments of
corrections, worked most effectively 1 9 5
State legislatures have also impeded the Court's involvement and
chances to regulate. Elsewhere I have documented every shift a death
penalty state in this country has made in its choice of execution meth-
ods over a 125-year period. As a regular practice during this period,
191 See Denno, supra note 168, at 116-25; Denno, supra note 161, at g1-n7.
192 See Denno, supra note 168, at 92-95, 100-12; Denno, supra note 161, at 93-95, 101-17.
193 See Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 96o (ggg) (granting certiorari to review a challenge to the use
of electrocution), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000) (dismissing certio-
rari following Florida's legislative change); Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. gl8 (1996) (vacating and
remanding the Ninth Circuit decision finding lethal gas unconstitutional in light of California's
legislative change).
194 Denno, supra note 170, at 754-63.
195 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion) (warning against "em-
broil[ing] the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise [and] . . . intrud[ing]
on the role of state legislatures in implementing their execution procedures").
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states would switch to new execution methods as soon as it looked as
though their old methods could be considered unconstitutional, thereby
rendering inviolate the constitutional integrity of the purportedly prob-
lematic method. For example, California, like all states, started with
hanging. When hanging became controversial, the state then changed
to lethal gas. But when the Court had granted certiorari to review the
constitutionality of lethal gas in light of horrific accounts of the excru-
ciatingly slow rates at which those subjected to it suffocated to death,
California changed to a procedure allowing a choice between lethal gas
and lethal injection, which the state has maintained to this day. The
transition to include lethal injection mooted the potential constitution-
al problem since inmates then had the opportunity to select a method
of execution other than lethal gas.1 9 6  Similarly, Florida also started
with hanging, and then changed to electrocution, before finally adopt-
ing lethal injection. These moves mooted the Court's grant of certio-
rari to review the constitutionality of electrocution in light of a long
string of botched executions.197
States now engage in comparable types of switches with lethal in-
jection protocols and drugs, aiming not only to perpetuate the death
penalty, but also to evade the Court's review. For example, when so-
dium thiopental was no longer available starting in 2009, fourteen
states switched to pentobarbital over the following two years. When
the manufacturer of pentobarbital subsequently foreclosed the drug's
sale to departments of corrections for purposes of execution, states
started seeking lethal injection drugs wherever they could find them
and modifying their lethal injection protocols accordingly. My study of
over 300 lower court cases that cited Baze found that these modifica-
tions took place with disturbing speed, with states doing so both out of
necessity (because drugs were not available) and also to evade detec-
tion (to keep the details of the process unavailable).198  Until lethal in-
jection litigation started to gain traction,19 9 federal and state court
196 See generally Denno, supra note 168, app. 2; Denno, supra note 163, app. i tbls.3-7, app. 3;
Denno, supra note 162, at 1339-43; Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-execution [https://perma.cc/VE3Q-LE7T].
197 Denno, supra note 168, at 78-81, 137-38, 191; see also SARAT, supra note 16o, at 2-3, 7, 23-
25, 78, 81-82, 86-87, 17 1-72 (detailing botched electrocutions in Florida).
198 See generally Denno, supra note 163, at 1346-66.
199 Litigation concerning the constitutionality of lethal injection started as soon as lethal injec-
tion was adopted. See Denno, supra note 163, at 375-76. That said, the litigation did not start to
gain substantial traction until the mid-2000S, when a federal district court in California became
involved in the details of the procedure's application as well as the administration of California's
three-drug protocol. See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The
Morales court was particularly concerned about expert testimony indicating that an inmate who
received an insufficient amount of sodium thiopental might still be conscious and aware when
executioners inject the pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Id. at 1044. As a result,
the court determined that, in order to execute Michael Morales, California would either have to
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judges often turned a blind eye to problems with execution methods,
especially lethal injection, again deferring to prison officials' purported
expertise regarding the execution process. 2 0 0
provide qualified medical personnel to ensure that Morales was unconscious during the procedure
or change the Department of Corrections' protocol so that only sodium thiopental would be ad-
ministered and not the two more controversial drugs. Id. at 1047. The State chose to involve
medical experts (two anesthesiologists) rather than change the protocol. Yet when the experts
were more fully informed of their duties and the extent of their involvement in the execution, they
resigned hours before Morales was to be executed. For a discussion of Morales and its repercus-
sions, see Denno, supra note 161, at 51-58. California has not conducted an execution
since. State by State Database (California), DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state by-state [https://perma.cc/C7EV-2UG2] (select "California" from the
drop-down menu). The Morales case broke ground in a range of different ways that enhanced the
litigation buildup to Baze: (r) the federal district court judge (Judge Fogel) became proactively
involved in the process, thereby exposing to great effect the flaws and ignorance of the California
Department of Corrections and the marked degree of its discretionary decision-making; (2) Judge
Fogel also held an extensive evidentiary hearing about California's procedures, which brought
transparency to an otherwise hidden and highly inadequate process; (3) Morales revealed the med-
ical profession's role in executions, particularly lethal injection, in a way that demanded a public
response from medical societies and practitioners; and (4) judges in other states, such as Chief
Judge Gaitan of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, stopped deferring as
much to departments of corrections and instead became more involved in the lethal injection pro-
cess. An overview of other developments at the time that contributed to this trajectory, in addi-
tion to personalized accounts by Judge Fogel and Chief Judge Gaitan, can be found in Symposi-
um, The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701 (2008).
200 The first Eighth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of lethal injection aptly illus-
trates the extent to which legislatures and courts deferred (and still defer) to departments of cor-
rections personnel due to the vagueness of lethal injection statutes and the reluctance of judges to
be more involved. In Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the inmate's challenge by noting that cases including In
re Kemmler had been cited to support the proposition that other methods of execution were con-
stitutional and that lethal injection was consistent with evolving standards of decency. See id. at
5og. The court underscored the fact that the Texas statute did not specify the drugs that were
supposed to be used in a lethal injection. Such a gap was no less transparent than the statutes
that set forth other execution methods. For example, no court had found an electrocution statute
to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 5 11-13. Lastly, the court stressed that, even though the
director of the Department of Corrections decided which lethal injection drugs and procedures
were to be used for executions, such a role did not constitute an inappropriate delegation of the
state's legislative power. Id. at 514. Rather, a legislative body "may delegate to the administra-
tive tribunal or officer power to prescribe details." Id.
The themes in Granviel would carry forward in lethal injection litigation during the ensuing
decades, albeit in different iterations depending on the circumstances. See Denno, supra note 163,
at 375-98. As I have detailed in two national studies of lethal injection protocols in 2001 and
2005, some states historically refused to reveal what drugs they were using or their amounts de-
spite lethal injection challenges attempting to acquire such information. See Denno, supra note
161, at 91-rr6; Denno, supra note 162, at 1346-71; Denno, supra note 168, at 105-260. Secrecy
has prevailed throughout the process and up to the present day: the bulk of lethal injection litiga-
tion concerns attorneys' efforts to discover what drugs departments of corrections are using, the
amounts and sources of those drugs, the executioners' qualifications, and other basic details sur-
rounding death penalty administration. In sum, apart from the occasional involvement from the
judiciary, departments of corrections generally still control the lethal injection process
in death penalty states. See Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www
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In essence, then, there has been a collective, concerted effort over
the decades to perpetuate the death penalty on the legislative, judicial,
and prison-administrative levels. If it appeared as though a method of
execution were going to come under constitutional attack, then a state
would routinely switch to another method of execution (usually lethal
injection). Similarly, if the last lethal injection drug started to cause
problems, then prison officials would find a new one. Moreover, at all
three levels of administration, states have commonly made similar
kinds of decisions with regard to their lethal injection procedures
in order to overcome national-level challenges to the death penalty.
These similarities may come about when one state simply follows what
another state is doing or when states share strategies or sources of
pharmaceuticals. States that wish to continue lethal injections have an
incentive to keep the process out of the federal purview as much as
possible.
Prison officials also avoid federal regulation by keeping much of
the lethal injection process secret. Such secrecy has existed even from
the start, when Oklahoma adopted lethal injection, and it has contin-
ued in full force ever since. This secrecy makes it very difficult for at-
torneys to fairly represent their clients and for legislatures and courts
to assess the constitutionality of the method at issue.2 0 1
For decades, most states made some decisions about lethal injection
and other execution methods with a degree of uniformity that approx-
imated de facto national regulation. For example, until 2oog nearly
all states used the same three-drug lethal injection protocol that
Oklahoma adopted in 1977 and that was under Eighth Amendment
review in Baze, thereby bolstering the Baze plurality's holding that
Kentucky's protocol was not "objectively intolerable." 2 0 2
(d) Conflating Lethal Injection Litigation with Abolition. - Per-
haps more than any other death penalty doctrine, lethal injection chal-
lenges are conflated by legislatures, courts, and the public with the
goal of abolition more generally. There are several reasons for this as-
sociation. Because lethal injection challenges can apply to all inmates,
their impact can be more expansive. If a method of execution were
found to be unconstitutional, states would not be able to execute any-
one until they acquired another viable execution method. In contrast,
efforts to exclude and protect a particular category or class of defend-
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/K76H-LBAM] (detailing past and current
litigation by state).
201 For discussions of states' efforts to keep the process secretive, see generally Eric Berger,
Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367 (2014);
Denno, supra note 168, at go-I25; Denno, supra note 161, at gi-ror, 117-23; and Denno, supra
note 162, at 1376-81.
202 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62 (2008).
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ants, such as juveniles, would only be relevant to a limited number of
individuals who fit that age range. For example, after juveniles be-
came excluded from death eligibility following Roper, the total nation-
al number of inmates was only moderately affected. 2 0 3
The abolition focus also plays out at the Court. As mentioned, the
Court was late to review the constitutionality of an execution method.
Baze was the Court's first case, followed by Glossip. Yet both cases
include in-depth statements by Justices expressing their disagreement
with the death penalty - Justice Stevens's concurrence in Baze 2 0 4 and
Justice Breyer's dissent in Glossip.2 0 5
Even though Justice Stevens felt bound by precedent to continue to
support the death penalty and therefore upheld the death sentence in
Baze (p. 266), he used his concurrence as a platform to make what was
then a startling pronouncement. Long a death penalty advocate,
Justice Stevens concluded on the basis of his decades of experience on
the Court that Furman was right and that the death penalty violates
the Eighth Amendment (p. 266).206 In turn, Justice Scalia attempted
to contradict Justice Stevens's arguments point by point, making much
of Baze a focus on the death penalty itself. 2 0 7
In Glossip, Justice Breyer's dissent was a comprehensive and so-
phisticated overview of the major arguments against the death penalty
Justice Breyer also signed onto Justice Sotomayor's dissent, which was
highly critical of the way lethal injection is practiced in Oklahoma. 2 0 8
Yet, in contrast to Baze, much of Glossip concerned a debate about the
death penalty and its link to lethal injection litigation. Writing for the
majority, Justice Alito stressed, for example, that "anti-death-penalty
advocates" were responsible for the drug shortages because they inten-
tionally pressured pharmaceutical companies to withhold their
drugs. 2 0 9 Justice Alito went into significant detail, but the takeaway is
that in the only two cases in which the Court constitutionally evaluat-
ed a method of execution (that being lethal injection), both cases in-
cluded substantial discussion and debate about abolition. 2 1 0
How do these cases further explain why execution methods are not
nationally regulated? To the extent that lethal injection challenges ap-
pear to be a gateway to abolition, they may be viewed as needing less
regulation and representing more of a political stance. Courts may al-
203 See STREIB, supra note 132, at 3.
204 Baze, 553 U.S. at 71-87 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
205 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755-77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206 Baze, 553 U.S. at 71-87 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
207 Id. at 87-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
208 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2780-97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 2733 (majority opinion).
210 Id. at 2733, 2737-39.
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so believe that acceptance of a challenge to lethal injection poses far
too great a risk of leading to the abolition of the death penalty. While
there may be some merit to this argument due to lethal injection's liti-
gation success, such an approach disregards the evidence suggesting
that lethal injection is one of the most troublesome of all execution
methods and in need of repair.
Regardless, neither Baze nor Glossip has provided much, if any,
regulatory framework. The three-drug protocol upon which Baze was
based is no longer available, rendering the decision relatively ineffec-
tual. Likewise, Glossip's reach has been limited because states gener-
ally do not want to take the risk of relying on a drug as problematic as
midazolam, especially when other drugs or execution methods are
available.
Looking to the Court's treatment (or lack thereof) of execution-
method challenges generally, and lethal injection challenges specifical-
ly, the Steikers might have argued that some of the most important
aspects of the death penalty process simply evade review or resist
national regulation. Consequently, the Court's project seems increas-
ingly doomed to fail. Alternatively, perhaps execution methods are an
extreme example of the Court's shirking - simply failing to regulate
where it really should - and the solution isn't abolition necessarily,
but instead taking seriously the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause vis-a-vis execution methods. And if that regulation cannot be
accomplished, then the Eighth Amendment requires abolition. Either
way, the Steikers' model would benefit from exploring and articulating
how the constitutionality of execution methods fits their focus on na-
tional constitutional regulation.
(e) Destabilization. - In 2009, states' uniformity in lethal injec-
tion protocols ended when the United States experienced a nationwide
shortage of sodium thiopental, the first of the three drugs used in the
standard protocol. 2 1 1 This shortage was not the result of lethal injec-
tion litigation, but rather of the inability of the drug's sole manufac-
turer, Hospira, to acquire the component chemicals. 2 1 2 But the inci-
dent triggered a series of destabilizing events that contributed to the
boom in lethal injection challenges.
Lethal injection states throughout the country adopted a scatter-
shot approach to acquiring lethal injection drugs and increasingly ex-
perimented with new and untried drugs. 2 1 3 While the FDA may be-
come even more involved in remedying the drug-shortage issue in the
future, at the present time there are a range of typically short-lived
211 Denno, supra note 162, at 1360.
212 Id. at 1360-61.
213 Id. at 1362-68.
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drug protocols available. There are growing teams of sophisticated lit-
igators who question the continual array of drugs and drug protocols
that are recommended. It is this kind of destabilization that has per-
petuated lethal injection challenges throughout the country and forced
a fair number of states to cease using any drugs at all for the foresee-
able future because they are unable to acquire them. 2 1 4 This drug fi-
asco has raised doubts about the humaneness and effectiveness of le-
thal injection, thus fostering a legal, cultural, and scientific story that
will continue to have a devastating effect on the lethal injection pro-
cess and, perhaps, on the death penalty as a whole.
C. An Uncertain Future
The death penalty can be vulnerable to unanticipated influences.
Indeed, observers of the death penalty are continuously reminded that,
while there are trends going in the direction of abolition, the system is
elastic. Currently, two New Jersey state senators are trying to bring
back the state's death penalty (it was voted out in 2007), and
Nebraska voted the penalty out only to bring it back a year later.2 15 If
abolition is to take place at some point, it will be a variable, nonlinear
process with marked irregularities and inconsistencies.
Does a Donald Trump presidency, for example, threaten the
Steikers' prediction that the Supreme Court will strike down the death
penalty within the next decade or two? 2 1 6 After all, President Trump
214 See Manny Fernandez, Executions Stall as States Seek Different Drugs, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2cI3/Ii/og/us/executions-stall-as-states-seek-different
-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/T857-A7VL]; see also State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc
/8N88-J6 4 3] (providing the latest update on which states are not able to access lethal injection
drugs).
215 See Michael Boren, Reviving the Death Penalty in N.J.: The Case For and Against,
PHILLY.COM (NOV. 25, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/new-jersey/20i6II25
Reviving-the-death-penaltyinNJThecasejfor-andagainst.html [https://perma.cc/7UKg
-RF6G]; Aliyah Frumin, Election 2016: Nebraska, Oklahoma Vote in Favor of Death
Penalty, NBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2Q16, 12:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2oi6-election
-day/election-20I6-nebraska-oklahoma-vote-favor-death-penalty-n68130 [https://perma.cc/g85V
-SYS8].
216 See Chris McDaniel & Chris Geidner, How Donald Trump Could Revitalize the Death
Penalty, BUzzFEED NEWS (Nov. IO, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://www.buzzfeed
.conchrismcdaniel/how-donald-trump-could-revitalize-the-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/5 64 R
-SDTR] (noting then-President-elect Donald Trump's "steadfast" endorsement of the death penal-
ty and the potential for him to revitalize it in three ways through: (r) the selection of a pro-death
penalty Supreme Court nominee; (2) greater support of the federal death penalty; and (3) more
flexibility about states' acquisition of lethal injection drugs); Austin Sarat, Opinion, A
Comeback for the Death Penalty?, CNN (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:39 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2Oi6/iI/I4/opinions/comeback-for-death-penalty-opinion-sarat [https://perma
.cc/2XMY-R4BP] ("Trump's election is likely to put on hold any prospect that the Supreme Court
will take up Justice Stephen Breyer's recent invitation to his fellow justices to reconsider the con-
stitutionality of capital punishment.").
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has expressed strong support for the death penalty when his views
were evoked regarding the killing of police officers. 2 1 7
A crystal ball is always murky when a viewer tries to see the future
of the death penalty, particularly when predictions rest so heavily on
the makeup and decisionmaking power of the Supreme Court. As the
Steikers point out, when examining the death penalty over the dec-
ades, "[a]gain and again, the Supreme Court's constitutional interven-
tions took unexpected turns and produced results that were not antici-
pated by the Court or by knowledgeable observers, [the Steikers]
included" (p. 5).218 That said, the Steikers build in contingencies for
Justice Gorsuch, President Trump's first appointee to the Supreme Court, has been primari-
ly characterized as pro-death penalty. While those who know him praise his independence and
open-mindedness, he has also long embraced "conservative values" and leanings. See Kimberly
Kindy, Sari Horwitz & William Wan, Simply Stated, Gorsuch Is Steadfast and Surprising,
WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2Cl7), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/gorsuch-profile
[https://perma.cc/7RN5-W99T]. In addition, a wide range of commentators view him as pro-
death penalty. See, e.g., Eric Citron, Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 13, 2017, 12:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2cI7/Ci/potential-nominee-profile-neil
-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/3WXM-LKEW] ("Gorsuch, like Scalia, has not been a friendly vote for
death penalty petitioners pursuing relief from their sentences through federal habeas . . . . What-
ever the source of the position, however, it is clear that Gorsuch's position in death penalty cases
is likely to be quite close to Scalia's, and very unlikely to make the court any more solicitous of
the claims of capital defendants."); Andrew Cohen, Neil Gorsuch: Scalia Without the Scowl,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:02 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/20I7/OI
/31/neil-gorsuch-scalia-without-the-scowl [https://perma.cc/6TBZ-RQ6G] ("Like Scalia, Gorsuch
strongly supports the death penalty and has consistently voted against death row inmates seeking
relief at the roth Circuit. What is less clear is what Gorsuch thinks of the cutting-edge issues in
capital law - issues like lethal injection secrecy, judicial overrides, and the execution of intellec-
tually disabled prisoners."); Who Is Judge Neil Gorsuch?, Fox NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017)
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/20I7/OI/3i/who-is-judge-neil-gorsuch.html [https://perma.cc
/PLA2-TAgL] ("An academic study from November comparing top court prospects to Scalia -
based on judicial philosophy and other factors - put Gorsuch second among Trump's 'List of 21'
for his 'Scalia-ness.' His views on criminal law (including the death penalty), interstate com-
merce, and religious liberty match much of Scalia's jurisprudence."); Why Democrats Are Chal-
lenging Neil Gorsuch's Nomination, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2Q17), http://www.economist.com
/blogs/economist-explains/20r7/O2/economist-explains-6 [https://perma.cc/2QMD-AM6D] ("Mr.
Gorsuch also supports the constitutionality of capital punishment . . . .").
217 Jeremy Diamond, Trump: Death Penalty for Cop Killers, CNN (Dec. II, 2015, 9:25 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/20I5/I2/Io/politics/donald-trump-police-officers-death-penalty [https://perma
.cc/2DXQ-HXX5] (assuring members of the New England Police Benevolent Association that, as
President, he would provide a "strong, strong statement" that he would support the death penalty
for "anybody killing a police officer").
218 In a very recent example, voters in three states (California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) reaf-
firmed support for the death penalty in the November 2016 election. See Emily Lane, How Will a
Trump White House Impact the Death Penalty in Louisiana?, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. r5, 2016,
11:04 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/20I6/ii/how-will-a-trump-white-houseji.html
[https://perma.cc/F2 7 G-4 LED]. Nebraska voters reinstated the death penalty, reversing its legis-
lature'S 2015 decision to repeal it. As mentioned above, California voters approved a proposal to
quicken appeals to speed the execution process and rejected a proposal to repeal the state's death
penalty altogether. In turn, Oklahoma approved a measure that further protected the death pen-
alty by providing contingency methods of execution in anticipation of the Supreme Court declar-
ing other methods unconstitutional. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note I, at 8-g.
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such challenging scenarios, including a section in their book on five
Justices who have switched from their pro-death penalty stances
(pp. 258-71). In addition, there are other forces that the Steikers in-
clude in their abolition net that suggest they are not entirely relying on
the Court's composition in their optimistic argument about abolition.
This Book Review has sought to add perspective on that abolition ar-
gument from a multidisciplinary framework, focusing on extralegal
pressures and variables.
CONCLUSION
Writing a book on the death penalty is difficult on many levels, not
the least of which is that it involves the need to recognize continual
cultural and political shifts that could impact how a nation punishes
its citizens. Shortly after Courting Death was released, the United
States voted in a new pro-death penalty President, Nebraska's citizens
reinstated their death penalty, and California's citizens chose to
speed up executions rather than eliminate the state's death penalty
entirely.219
None of these developments should change a reader's interpreta-
tions of the Steikers' book. The death penalty remains the most fragile
it has been since 1976, and our current society seems comfortable with
that status. The Steikers' prediction - that, when abolition seems
right, it will come by way of a Supreme Court decision (pp. 258,
321)- readily comports with the death penalty's trajectory over the
last fifty years under a range of different administrations and Supreme
Court Justices. In addition, the Steikers offer an abolition "blueprint"
(p. 271) that is thoughtful and sound. Whether there will be a
"Furman II" (p. 258) remains to be seen, but the Steikers' book will
surely be at the forefront of the debate about that possibility
However, as commentators have argued, particularly regarding California, these outcomes may be
more a result of the divided views on the death penalty throughout the country and less a result of
broader political trends. See Jazmine Ulloa, Analysts Caution Against Blaming So-Called 'Trump
Effect' for Death Penalty Repeal's Defeat, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://www
.1atimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-analysts-caution-against-blaming
-the- 1479149162-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/P5PX-TC8J].
219 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note I, at 8-g.
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